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INTRODUCTION

The United States and its commercial citizenry have
significant, and financially valuable, interests when it comes to
foreign protection for popular U.S. brand names.1 Commercial
actors pay close attention to the availability of trademark
protection abroad, especially protection available in advance of
the establishment of local sales or business units. For example,
McDonald’s Corporation fought hard in the 1990s to protect its
trademarks from a local infringer in South Africa before
beginning to operate in that country.2 It succeeded. Starbucks
Corporation successfully defended its rights in Russia against a
trademark “pirate” who registered the STARBUCKS mark in
2005 and then tried to extort $600,000 from the company when it
contemplated opening local units.3 Successes like these depend
on foreign enforcement of internationally agreed protection for

1
See, e.g., 100 Best Global Brands, BUS. WK., Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.
businessweek.com/interactive_reports/best_global_brands_2009.html (ranking the
one hundred most valuable global brands and finding half to be owned by U.S.
companies); The 100 Top Brands, BUS. WK., Aug. 1, 2005, at 90–94 (ranking fiftythree U.S. brands among the top 100 global brands in terms of economic value).
2
See McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant, 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA)
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1996/82.html; see also 5
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 29:62 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the McDonald’s case in South Africa); cf.
McDonald’s Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp. Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 200 (Jam. Sup. Ct.)
(refusing a preliminary injunction against a Jamaican restaurant operator using the
name “McDonald’s” and leaving for a full trial the question of the relevant date by
which McDonald’s Corp. would be required to prove its trademark goodwill had
reached Jamaica and whether such goodwill is obtainable under Jamaican law
without local business operations).
3
See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:61 (discussing the Starbucks case in
Russia); see also Kim Tong-hyung, Starbucks Loses Trademark Dispute, KOREA
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007 (referencing the Korean Supreme Court’s opinion in a case
where Starbucks and an alleged infringer had both opened their first Korean
locations in 1999 and translating that opinion as stating: “Considering the period of
time Starbucks has used its trademark in business, how it was represented in
advertisements, and the frequency of such advertisements, we cannot conclude that
the Starbucks trademark was well-known in the local market at the time Elpreya
registered its [Starpreya] trademark.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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well-known marks. But can a foreign company considering an
expansion into the U.S. market expect comparable treatment
here? In light of recent developments in U.S. law, the answer is
a resounding “maybe.”
As a result, foreign support for
enforcement of this vital type of trademark protection may
wane.4 Decreased international enforcement of protections for
well-known foreign marks5 would be very costly for U.S.
businesses.
Protection for well-known foreign marks is required under
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
(the “Paris Convention”)6 as well as the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS
Agreement”)7 and several other international agreements of
which the United States is a member nation.8 Owners of wellknown foreign marks have sought protection in the United States
through both civil litigation and inter partes proceedings at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. Not all United
States courts facing a well-known mark claim have found the
foreign mark at issue to be well known or otherwise to satisfy the
requirements for a successful trademark infringement suit.9 But
4
See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539
(1995) (“If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords
and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be
most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such [a] manner as to
violate international agreements.”); see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (making the more general, but no less powerful,
observation that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains”).
5
See infra Part II for a discussion of the meaning of “well-known foreign marks”
and the scope of protection for those marks under international agreements.
6
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, Mar. 20,
1888, 13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
7
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
16(2)–(3), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, annex 1C, art. 22.1, 108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
8
See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1708(6), Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); Inter-American Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection, art. 7, Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 2918; see also sources
cited infra note 55.
9
A successful trademark infringement action requires proof of: (1) ownership of
rights in a mark; (2) protectability of the mark, with protectable marks being those
with either inherent distinctiveness or acquired distinctiveness and with some
evidentiary benefits being gained by registration of the mark as compared to an
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until very recently, no court had denied the existence of Lanham
Act protection for well-known foreign marks.10 In 2004, the
Ninth Circuit expressly held that well-known foreign marks are
entitled to protection under federal law.11 A 2007 Second Circuit
decision, however, flatly denied the existence of such protection.12
This divergence has muddied the water with respect to the
availability of protection in the United States for well-known
foreign marks that have been neither registered nor used in
commerce in the United States.13

unregistered mark; and (3) a likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers about
the origin, sponsorship, affiliation, or connection of the goods or services in question.
See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117
(2004); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1992); see also
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a)–(b), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). For the difference between
inherent and acquired distinctiveness, see infra note 93.
10
See infra Part III. In brief, the recent move away from protection began with a
2005 Southern District of New York decision that refused to recognize a cause of
action for infringement of a well-known foreign mark under the Lanham Act. See
Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). Just the year before, a different judge in the Southern District of New York
had found the opposite to be true. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,
2004 WL 602295, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004). Earlier decisions of federal courts
and the Trademark Trial & Appeals Board had acknowledged the doctrine but rarely
applied it, based on the positions of the parties and the facts of the cases. Two state
court decisions in New York had provided protection under state law. The
affirmative split between circuits arose from a 2004 Ninth Circuit decision and a
2007 Second Circuit decision, as further outlined and detailed in Part III.
11
See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098–99, 1109
(9th Cir. 2004).
12
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007).
13
More recent developments have done nothing to ameliorate the confusion. In
its 2007 decision in ITC, the Second Circuit certified two questions regarding wellknown foreign marks to the New York Court of Appeals at the same time it denied
the existence of federal protection for such marks. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 9
N.Y.3d 467, 471, 880 N.E.2d 852, 854, 850 N.Y.S.2d 366, 368 (2007). The New York
high court answered the questions by affirming the existence of New York state
protection through a misappropriation theory under unfair competition law and
providing a fairly generous standard to be met by the foreign mark in order for the
protection to apply. See id. And although the Second Circuit found the state law
doctrine to be inapplicable in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.
2008), a Southern District of New York judge applied it less than a year later, in
favor of the owner of a different well-known foreign mark. See Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 587 F. Supp. 2d 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting the
owner of a foreign mark a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an earlier judgment on
grounds that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in ITC was an
intervening development of law creating “extraordinary circumstances” warranting
relief), rev’d, 2010 WL 2759416 (2d Cir. July 14, 2010) (reversing the district court
on the basis that the New York decision was not an intervening development of law
warranting relief under Rule 60(b)).
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By denying the existence of a federal trademark
infringement or unfair competition cause of action against a
junior use of a well-known foreign mark, the Second Circuit
brought itself into direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit. The
Second Circuit decision also conflicts with the broader trend
toward greater internationalization of strong intellectual
property enforcement procedures and standards with continued
national, rather than international, implementation and
enforcement of those procedures and standards.14 In addition,
the international trend is unquestionably toward increased
minimum levels of substantive protection for intellectual
property owners.15 The United States government strongly
supports these trends, and it has even been accused of bullying
other nations to increase their substantive protections.16
Intellectual property protection is an area where the United
States generally prefers to be at the forefront, rather than among
the recalcitrant nations bringing up the rear.
14
See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International
Intellectual Property System, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 2–8 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007).
15
Compare Paris Convention, supra note 6, arts. 4, 5bis, 6–10 (containing the
minimum substantive trademark rights required under the Paris Convention), with
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 2(1), 15–21 (including in the TRIPS
Agreement all of the Paris Convention minima for trademarks but adding further
minimum substantive trademark rights); compare Paris Convention, supra note 6,
arts. 4–5quater (containing the minimum substantive patent rights required under
the Paris Convention), with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 2(1), 27–34
(including in the TRIPS Agreement all of the Paris Convention minima for patents
but adding further minimum substantive patent rights); compare Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 2, 2bis, 6bis, 8–16, Sept. 9,
1886, revised July 24, 1967, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (containing
the minimum substantive copyright rights required under the Berne Convention),
with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 9–14 (including in the TRIPS Agreement
all of the Berne Convention minima for copyright except article 6bis but adding
further minimum substantive copyright rights).
16
See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 323–31 (2006) (outlining a range of U.S.
intellectual property negotiating activities that developing nations perceived to be
coercive, particularly with respect to the incorporation of intellectual property
protections within the GATT system upon formation of the World Trade
Organization); see also Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 139–40 (2000)
(discussing the “Special 301” unilateral retaliation process instituted by the United
States in 1989, which requires the United States Trade Representative to assess,
cite, and eventually sanction countries, via trading duties or the like, when countries
are argued to be out of compliance with their international intellectual property
obligations in a way that harms U.S. trade interests).
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The divergence of the Second Circuit from the Ninth Circuit
and earlier favorable discussions of the well-known foreign
marks doctrine in case law raises the very real question of
whether the United States fully complies with its international
obligations to protect well-known foreign marks. If the Second
Circuit has accurately assessed the scope of Lanham Act
protection for foreign mark owners, the United States may not be
in compliance unless state law fills the gaps in protection. If the
Second Circuit is wrong, on the other hand, then there is less
cause for concern, as that decision would simply represent one
aberrant judicial decision.17
In this Article, I argue that the United States does, in fact,
provide the required protection under the Lanham Act. Although
the implementation is not a model of clarity,18 current federal law
provides protection for well-known foreign marks, allowing
owners of well-known foreign marks to seek redress in the
United States for infringing acts that occur in the United States.
Part II of the Article explains the sources and content of the U.S.
treaty obligations to protect well-known foreign marks. Part III
sets out a brief account of U.S. judicial decisions related to the
protection of well-known marks. Part IV of the Article explains
how and why section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides the wellknown foreign mark protection required by U.S. treaty
obligations. Key to this analysis is the issue of territoriality
within trademark law.
The Second Circuit decision
acknowledges territoriality as fundamental to international
trademark law. But it misapplies an oversimplified domestic
rule of thumb to the complex issue presented in lieu of
conducting a deeper analysis of the plain statutory language and
U.S. international obligations. I also provide some limited
guidance on how protection for well-known foreign marks should
be applied and explain how that protection fits quite naturally
within the traditional model of trademark protection in the
United States.19 In so doing, I urge courts to integrate the
17
It will be a more problematic aberrant decision than a district court decision
would be, of course, since it will remain detrimental to foreign mark owners
litigating within the Second Circuit until such time as the decision can be corrected
by an en banc decision in another case or by the Supreme Court.
18
As set forth in Part IV, infra, the available Lanham Act protection for wellknown foreign marks relies on the interaction of several statutory sections with
underlying common law trademark principles.
19
See infra Part IV.
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internationally agreed principles related to well-known marks
within the broad scope of the unfair competition provision of
section 43(a). As a whole, this Article gives practitioners and
courts a roadmap for providing owners of well-known foreign
marks the protection that the United States has agreed to give to
them and that both the owners and the consuming public
deserve.
II. U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO WELL-KNOWN
TRADEMARKS
Before continuing this Article, the reader is well-served by
the definition of a few terms used here. First, the reader should
be aware that a “mark,” although roughly a “brand name,” is
more specifically any word, name, symbol, or other device used in
connection with goods or services to indicate the source of the
goods or services and to identify and distinguish the goods or
services from those of other traders.20 In the United States,
rights may be created by use in commerce and registration of a
mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office21 or by use in
commerce alone.22 Most countries, on the other hand, provide
“trademark” protection only to registered marks, although they

20

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining both “trademark” and “service
mark”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 15(1) (describing a protectable
trademark). In certain more technical matters, there is a difference between
trademarks—used for goods—and service marks, but for most purposes there is no
difference under current law in the United States or elsewhere. Thus, the term
“marks” is often used as a shorthand for both service marks and trademarks, and in
many instances the term “trademark” is used to include both trademarks and
service marks—for example, references to “trademark rights” include rights in either
a service mark or a trademark. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “mark”).
21
A domestic trademark owner must use a mark in commerce before a
registration may issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)–(d). An owner of a foreign
registration in the owner’s home country may register that mark federally without
placing the mark in use in commerce. See id. § 1126(e). State registration systems
also exist in the United States, but many of these systems do little more than
duplicate rights available through use alone. See Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing
State Trademark Registrations (Working Paper).
22
See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1992)
(“[I]t is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks
and that the general principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the
Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an
unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).”).
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may protect users of unregistered but distinctive trading
symbols, or “brand names,” against confusingly similar thirdparty uses under unfair competition laws.23
Second, although courts often use “well known” and “famous”
interchangeably with respect to the doctrine at issue here, I use,
whenever possible, only “well known.” A reference to “famous
marks” can be confusing to readers familiar with other aspects of
U.S. trademark law, specifically, the use of the term “famous” in
the Lanham Act’s provision on trademark dilution.24 In order to
avoid such confusion, I prefer “well-known marks.” Moreover,
the Paris Convention and other international agreements use the
term “well known.” Third, I use “foreign mark” and “well-known
foreign mark” rather than simply “well-known mark” in order to
acknowledge that the specific situation being addressed here
involves a mark used in at least one foreign country but that has
not become subject to protection in the United States by the more
traditional means of domestic use or registration.
In this Article, I refer to the users of marks as being “senior”
or “junior” according to worldwide seniority, rather than
according to domestic seniority. Therefore, the owner of the
foreign mark alleged to have been well known in the United
States at the time the domestic use began is the “senior user,”
while the user in the United States is the “junior user.” I use
this nomenclature even when all parties agree that the domestic
“junior user” was the first party to use the mark in commerce
within the United States, which would, in a purely domestic
dispute, place that party in senior user status.
Another key term and concept used in this Article is
“territoriality.” In trademark law, this term is generally utilized
as a shorthand reference to the geographic or geopolitical areas
where a mark is entitled to legal protection. In international
23

See 7 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, app. A5.
Trademark dilution is a cause of action separate from a classic confusionbased infringement claim. Under federal law, a dilution claim does not require proof
of a likelihood of confusion, cf. supra note 9, but does require proof that some kind of
association will arise as a result of the similarity between the famous mark and the
challenged use. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)–(C). The Lanham Act only provides this
broader protection to the owner of a “famous” mark. See id. § 1125(c)(1). A “famous”
mark is defined in the Lanham Act as one that is “widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or
services of the mark’s owner.” Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). An infringement claim, on the
other hand, is potentially available to any mark that is protectable. See Two Pesos,
505 U.S. at 769; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a)–(b), 1125(a)(1)(A).
24
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law, on the other hand, the term “territoriality” is used in
connection with the presumptive jurisdictional principle used as
a starting point for determining the scope of a country’s laws. As
a result, how “territoriality” should be defined and how the
concept should be applied in relation to a matter of international
trademark law depends on the context. “Territoriality” is not a
unitary concept in international trademark law: One facet of
“territoriality” refers to use-based rights in the United States,25
while the other facet has primarily international political
connotations.26 Courts have recently relied on the principle of
“territoriality” in analyzing arguments for federal protection for
well-known foreign marks, as shown in Part III.27 But as I
explain later in this Article, the courts do not generally analyze
the two separate facets of “territoriality”—the domestic and the
international.
Within U.S. domestic law, discussions of the territorial scope
of rights refer to the geographic area within the United States
where the user of a mark is entitled to exclude others from using
the same or a confusingly similar mark. In this context, the
territorial limits are derived in large part from an analysis of the
likelihood of confusion.28 Multiple uses of the same or similar
marks, even for the same or similar goods and services, are
tolerable and not in conflict when there is no likelihood of
confusion arising from the simultaneous uses. And this lack of
confusion has been deemed to exist, in many or most cases, when

25
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark
Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 888 (2004); see also Graeme W.
Austin, The Territoriality of United States Trademark Law, in 3 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
235, 236–39 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing the “domestic territoriality” of U.S.
trademark law).
26
See Dinwoodie, supra note 25; see also Austin, supra note 25, at 239–40
(discussing the “international territoriality” of trademark law).
27
See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161–63 (2d Cir. 2007); Grupo
Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2004).
28
Although the basic common law priority rule is, and was, priority of
appropriation—“first in time”—the Supreme Court confirmed a refinement to that
rule almost a century ago. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S.
90, 96–97, 100 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916).
The refinement provides that when two users operate in market remote from one
another, each can validly acquire trademark rights in his or her separate market, so
long as the second user to appropriate the mark did not act in bad faith. Hanover
Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415.
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the two users of the mark would not have the same customers
because the uses, and thus the customers, are geographically
remote from one another.29
In the context of international trademark protection,
“territoriality” refers primarily to the basic principle that a
nation cannot grant or enforce protection for a mark outside the
territorial borders of that nation. This political dimension to
trademark territoriality derives ultimately from the territorial
scope of each nation’s authority to govern.30 As a result, one who
wishes to establish trademark rights in more than one nation
must generally pursue those rights separately in each nation of
interest.31
Perceived deficiencies in completely territorial
schemes of trademark rights uncoordinated with one another in
any way led, in part, to the development of the Paris
Convention.32

29
This “domestic” form of territoriality is discussed in greater detail in Part
IV.C.1 infra.
30
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 291,
299–300 (7th ed. 2008) (explaining territoriality as the most common basis for
prescriptive jurisdiction in civil matters and noting that the territoriality of
prescriptive, or legislative jurisdiction, derives from the territorial sovereignty of
each nation). If a nation’s prescriptive power reaches only to the nation’s territorial
borders, then the force of its legislation or its common law rules will apply only
within that nation’s territory. In this way, each nation’s trademark laws—and thus
trademark rights granted or recognized under those laws—are said to be territorial.
31
There are exceptions to this nation-by-nation pursuit of rights, such as the
possibility of obtaining a registration for a Community Trade Mark, which is an EUwide registration. And, as discussed extensively by Graeme Dinwoodie in a recent
article, the generally territorially limited prescriptive reach of each nation’s laws
does not of itself create an infallible or inflexible choice of law rule to be applied to
any particular dispute with an international dimension. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of
Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 (2009).
32
Among the obligations of a member nation are commitments to provide
limited temporal priority to certain applications filed by nationals of other member
nations, see Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 4, to register without changes
certain trademarks previously registered in other member nations, id. art.
6quinquies, and to regard each registered mark as existing independently of marks
registered in other member nations, id. art. 6(3).
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The Paris Convention

The Paris Convention is the oldest major multilateral treaty
designed to improve the international protection of trademark
rights.33 Since 1925, it has required member nations to protect
well-known foreign marks.34
The Paris Convention’s major advance in international
intellectual property relations was implementing the principle of
national treatment within a treaty intended for widespread,
rather than only limited or regional implementation.35
Substantive rights obligations were minimal in the first
incarnation of the treaty, but its coverage was not then, and is
not now, limited to national treatment. The Convention also
obligates member nations to provide certain minimum
substantive trademark rights to nationals of other member
nations.36 One of those minimum substantive rights is the right
of a foreign national to obtain protection against the use or
registration of a mark in a member nation if the foreign
national’s mark is well known, a third party registers or uses the
mark for identical or similar goods, and the complained-of mark
is liable to create confusion.37 The basic obligation is to allow an
33
Id. Much ink has been spilled in the legal literature about the self-executing
or non-self-executing nature of the Paris Convention. But with respect to the
question specifically addressed in this Article, that issue falls somewhat to the side.
In this Article, I focus on the case of a mark that is well known in the United States
but not yet used or registered here. A minimalist interpretation of the Paris
Convention does not create a requirement for protection of a well-known mark in the
absence of use of the mark in the protecting country. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note
25, at 912–13. Instead, a minimalist interpretation holds that the Paris Convention
only mandates protection of a well-known mark in the absence of a registration,
leaving room for a country to require use. See id. The Lanham Act’s provisions
providing rights to unregistered marks that have been used in commerce would
therefore comply with that minimum requirement set forth in the Paris Convention.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S.
763, 768–69 (1992).
34
See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 89 (1968).
35
See Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 2.
36
See id. arts. 5quinquies, 6bis(1), 6quater, 6quinquies, 6sexies, 7, 8, 10bis; see
also BODENHAUSEN, supra note 34, at 30–31.
37
See Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis. The full text of article 6bis is as
follows:
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so
permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the
registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a
mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration
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“interested party” to intervene in a registration proceeding, to
request cancellation of a registration, or to object to the use of a
mark under certain conditions: (1) the mark is “a reproduction,
an imitation, or a translation” of a well-known foreign mark,
(2) the well-known mark and the mark being objected to are used
for identical or similar goods, and (3) the domestic use is “liable
to create confusion.”38 Well-known mark status is defined in the
Paris Convention only by the following characterization: “a mark
considered . . . to be well known in [a protecting] country as being
already the mark of a [protected foreign national].”39 This only
seems to mean that well-known status is to be determined by
each nation on an individual basis and that renown on a global
scale is not required. No more specific scope is provided, nor is
the standard for how much local knowledge of a mark would be
required for the mark to be “well known” in a country where
protection is sought.
The United States fulfills its obligations under article 6bis
for well-known foreign marks that have been either: (1) used in
the United States and registered on the Principal Register40 or
(2) used in the United States without registration but with
protection as a common law trademark under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.41 But if the Second Circuit’s recent decision is
or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or
similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of
the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or an
imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be
allowed for requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of the
Union may provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must be
requested.
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the
prohibition of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.
Id.
38

Id.
Id.
40
I refer here to both use and registration, rather than registration alone, for
the reasons explained in notes 253 and 256.
41
See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (stating that a mark cannot be registered with the
Patent and Trademark Office if it “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade
name previously used in the United States and not abandoned, as to be likely, when
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive”); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1057(b) (West 2011) (making a
certificate of registration on the principal register “prima facie evidence of the
validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s
39
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correct and if the Paris Convention requires the United States to
protect well-known foreign marks not used in this country, we
fall short of full compliance. Interestingly, the United States has
advocated in both the distant42 and recent43 past in favor of such
an obligation. Moreover, many Paris Convention nations provide
more extensive protection,44 even though many or even most of
ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark
in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the
certificate”); 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (allowing for an opposition proceeding based on a
belief by “[a]ny person . . . that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark
upon the principal register”); id. § 1064 (allowing a cancellation proceeding to be
filed by “any person who believes that he is or will be damaged . . . by the
registration of a mark on the principal register”); id. § 1114(1) (Lanham Act section
32’s protection for registered marks in a civil infringement proceeding); id. § 1125(a)
(Lanham Act section 43(a)’s protection for any trademark, whether registered or
unregistered, via a civil infringement proceeding).
42
A 1958 Paris Convention revision conference included a proposal to revise the
text to expressly oblige member nations to protect unused but well-known marks.
See BODENHAUSEN, supra note 34, at 91. Although only two out of twenty-seven
member nations voted against the proposal, see id. n.6, that minor opposition was
sufficient to block the change because revising the Paris Convention requires a true
consensus of the member nations. See id. at 164, 191–92. According to the record of
that 1958 revision conference, the United States proposed the change to require
protection of unused but well-known marks. See Union Internationale pour la
Protection de la Propriété Industrielle, Actes de la Conférence Réunie a Lisbonne
[Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their
International Registration] art. 6bis, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205. And in light of
the case law in 1958, persons responsible for determining the position of the United
States at that conference could reasonably have thought that protection without
domestic use was, in fact, the state of U.S. law. See infra Part III (discussing Maison
Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. 1936), and Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1959)).
43
In 1999, the United States joined a nonbinding, multilateral understanding
on well-known marks, the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks.
See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO Doc. 833(E),
Sept. 29, 1999 [hereinafter Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks], available
at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pub833.htm. That instrument
contains a provision prohibiting a standard for well-known status that would require
domestic use. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. According to Graeme
Dinwoodie, the United States was “extremely active in negotiating” the Joint
Recommendation. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Some Remarks on the Limits of
Harmonization, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 596, 600 (2006).
44
See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Rest., 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA),
at 18–20 (S. Afr.) (explaining that the term “well known” applies “not only [to] the
mark itself but also [to] the nationality, domicile or place of business of the mark’s
owner, and moreover the fact that the relevant country is a convention country”); see
also Ryota Charles Goto, Note, De Facto Abandonment of Territoriality: Protection of
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those nations typically do not provide any trademark-specific
protection without registration. Instead, many nations protect
unregistered marks, in certain circumstances, by applying their
broader laws against unfair competition. The United States, on
the other hand, has a long tradition of providing trademark
protection without registration.45 So of all nations, one might
think the United States should be at the forefront of a broad
article 6bis obligation.46
B.

The TRIPS Agreement

The TRIPS Agreement, the intellectual-property treaty
concluded as one of the foundational agreements of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), includes all substantial obligations
of the Paris Convention with respect to trademarks47 and
expands upon them as well.48 For example, the signatory nations
agreed to extend the Paris Convention well-known marks
obligation to include service marks as well as trademarks.49 The

(Not-So-)Well-Known Foreign Trademarks in Japan and the United States, 28
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 127–41 (2004) (discussing at length Japanese
protection for well-known foreign marks as well as Japanese protection against badfaith adoption of foreign marks even when not well known). Some nations provide
protection through the direct application of article 6bis, while others have expressly
and clearly provided the protection through national legislation. The means by
which several nations implement protection for well-known marks is set forth in
Frederick Mostert’s 1997 book on the subject. See FREDERICK W. MOSTERT, FAMOUS
AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS 153–422 (1997) (providing information on Argentina,
Australia, Benelux (the economic union through which Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg share uniform trademark law), Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom).
The book also provides an assessment of the state of U.S. law on the subject as of
1997, but as set forth in this Article, reevaluation of that position would be required
in light of post-1997 case law. Id.
45
See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and
use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the
person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long
recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England and of this
country, and by the statutes of some of the States.”).
46
See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 959–60 (observing that “U.S. law, as
one of the few use-based systems in the world, would seem well suited to
accommodate [an] approach [focusing on reach of goodwill and not just political
boundaries]”).
47
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
48
See id. arts. 15–21.
49
See id. art. 16(2) (“Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply,
mutatis mutandis, to services. In determining whether a trademark is well-known,
Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant
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TRIPS Agreement also expanded protection for well-known
foreign marks beyond uses or registrations that would create a
likelihood of confusion.50 TRIPS mandates protection against
unauthorized use or registration with goods or services dissimilar
from those associated with the well-known mark, provided that
the use would indicate a connection with the foreign owner and
would likely damage the interests of that owner.51
The TRIPS Agreement did not define the term “well-known
mark,” and, as noted above, the Paris Convention provides no
firm meaning for “well known.”52 The TRIPS Agreement states
only that member nations “shall take account of the knowledge of
the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including
knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as
a result of the promotion of the trademark.”53 As a result, the
exact meaning of “well-known mark” may continue to vary
internationally, but certain contours are consistent. Additional
consistency within international application of the concept of a
“well-known mark” may also arise from recent, although
nonbinding, international negotiations.
C.

Post-TRIPS Developments

The most recent, although nonbinding, multilateral effort to
improve protection for well-known marks in foreign markets is
the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks (“Joint Recommendation on
Well-Known Marks” or “Joint Recommendation”), which was
negotiated
through
the
World
Intellectual
Property
Organization.54 For most nations, the Joint Recommendation on
Well-Known Marks is simply an agreed but nonbinding
sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been
obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark.”).
50
See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text for the relevant portion of the
Paris Convention.
51
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 16(3) (“Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services which are not
similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered, provided that use of
that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and
provided that the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be
damaged by such use.”).
52
See Paris Convention, supra note 6.
53
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 16(2).
54
See Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks, supra note 43.

CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:14 PM

1362

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1347

recommendation on well-known marks. The United States,
however, has bound itself to observe the Joint Recommendation
through at least one bilateral agreement, a free trade agreement
with Singapore.55
And in light of the most-favored-nation
treatment provision in the TRIPS Agreement,56 the United States
must now provide to the nationals of all WTO member nations
the advantages provided to Singaporean nationals under the
binding bilateral agreement.57
The Joint Recommendation lists the following factors for the
analysis of a well-known mark:
1. the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the
relevant sector of the public;
2. the duration, extent, and geographical area of any use of the
mark;
3. the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion
of the mark, including advertising or publicity and the
presentation, at fairs or exhibitions, of the goods and/or services
to which the mark applies;
4. the duration and geographical area of any registrations,
and/or any applications for registration, of the mark, to the
extent that they reflect use or recognition of the mark;

55
See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., arts. 16.1(2)(b)(i), 16.2(4), May 6, 2003,
42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement] (containing a
commitment to “give effect” to articles 1–6 of the Joint Recommendation on WellKnown Marks and a provision nearly identical to article 16(3) of the TRIPS
Agreement: “Article 6bis of the Paris Convention . . . shall apply, mutatis mutandis,
to goods or services that are not similar to those identified by a well-known
trademark, whether registered or not, provided that use of that trademark in relation
to those goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or
services and the owner of the trademark and provided that the interests of the
owner of the trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.” (second emphasis
added)); see also Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4(1)(a), Oct. 24, 2000, 2000
U.S.T. LEXIS 160 (similar to provision in agreement with Singapore). The United
States also incorporated the Joint Recommendation into a nonbinding free trade
agreement with Chile. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.2(9), June 6,
2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text (last
visited Jan. 28, 2011) (“recogniz[ing] the importance of” the Joint Recommendation
on Well-Known Marks and agreeing to be “guided by [its] principles”).
56
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 4 (“With regard to the protection of
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.”).
57
See Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 603–04 (noting that the binding bilateral
agreements of the United States will, through the most-favored-nation obligation of
TRIPS, heighten U.S. obligations to all WTO members).

CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:14 PM

2010]

INT’L OBLIGATIONS IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW

1363

5. the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in
particular, the extent to which the mark was recognized as well
known by competent authorities;
6. the value associated with the mark.58

Countries guided by the Joint Recommendation on WellKnown Marks will look to whether the foreign mark is well
known in at least one relevant sector of the public in that
country.59 Relevant sectors of the public include:
(i) actual and/or potential consumers of the type of goods and/or
services to which the mark applies;
(ii) persons involved in channels of distribution of the type of
goods and/or services to which the mark applies;
(iii) business circles dealing with the type of goods and/or
services to which the mark applies.60

Perhaps most important for purposes of this Article,
however, is the following provision, which sets forth factors that
“shall not” be used when determining if a foreign mark is wellknown:
(a) A Member State shall not require, as a condition for
determining whether a mark is a well-known mark:
(i) that the mark has been used in, or that the mark has
been registered or that an application for registration of the
mark has been filed in or in respect of, the Member State;
(ii) that the mark is well known in, or that the mark has
been registered or that an application for registration of the
mark has been filed in or in respect of, any jurisdiction
other than the Member State; or
(iii) that the mark is well known by the public at large in
the Member State.61

The United States, in joining the Joint Recommendation, has
quite clearly entered into a group of nations that officially profess
to protect well-known foreign marks without domestic use and
that advocate for such protection. And as noted above, because
these provisions are expressly binding in at least one bilateral

58

Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks, supra note 43, art. 2(1)(b).
Id. art. 2(2)(b) (“Where a mark is determined to be well known in at least one
relevant sector of the public in a Member State, the mark shall be considered by the
Member State to be a well-known mark.”).
60
Id. art. 2(2)(a).
61
Id. art. 2(3).
59

CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:14 PM

1364

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1347

agreement, the obligations of the United States to all WTO
member nations have now been heightened.62
By providing factors to guide domestic decision makers, the
Joint
Recommendation
certainly
advanced
common
understanding related to, and was aimed at leveling the
international playing field with respect to, enforcement of the
well-known foreign marks doctrine. But even with these agreed
factors, there is no agreed standard that a country’s decision
makers are obligated to apply in judging these factors. Exactly
how deep or broad knowledge of a mark must be within that
country for the mark to be “well known” within the meaning of
the Joint Recommendation, the TRIPS Agreement, or the Paris
Convention remains internationally undefined.
The absence of an international standard when a mark is
“well known” means that the United States may set a relatively
high standard. It may not, however, refuse altogether to
recognize or to apply the doctrine. Recent decisions within the
Second Circuit may frustrate the policies and obligations
established and accepted by the executive and legislative
branches with respect to well-known foreign marks.63 These
62
While binding as between the contracting nations, neither the bilateral free
trade agreements nor the TRIPS Agreement is directly effective in U.S. law. See,
e.g., United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 108-78, § 102(a), 117 Stat. 948, 950 (2003); Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 13
(1994),
available
at
http://finance.senate.gov/library/reports/committee/
index.cfm?PageNum_rs=8. Nevertheless, courts should proceed with caution before
construing U.S. domestic law in a manner inconsistent with our international
obligations. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804).
63
See OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., USTR STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2007–2012, at 14
(2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ asset_upload_file
726_14695.pdf (citing U.S. judicial decisions generally as one of the external factors
influencing its ability to monitor and enforce U.S. rights under international
agreements). The administrative branch of the U.S. government quite clearly desires
to maintain and encourage high levels of international protection for well-known
U.S. marks. See, e.g., OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2009 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 102, 253, 339–40, 421, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2009/NTE/asset_upload_file40
5_15451.pdf (commenting on protection of well-known marks in China, Indonesia,
Mexico, and Russia); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2008 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 51, 110–11, 470, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2008/NTE/asset_upload_file36
5_14652.pdf (commenting on protection of well-known marks in Cambodia, China,
and Russia); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2007 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 52, 159–60, 291–92, 325, 327, 498–99, 541, available
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judicial decisions do not conclusively establish noncompliance by
the United States, as there are also other decisions protecting
well-known foreign marks and a strong statutory argument to
support Lanham Act protection. In the remainder of this Article,
I demonstrate that despite the Second Circuit’s pronouncement
to the contrary, U.S. law does protect well-known marks through
the Lanham Act in a way that fully complies with international
obligations and even the nonbinding Joint Recommendation.64
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2007/NTE/asset_upload_file
855_10945.pdf (commenting on protection of well-known marks in Cambodia, Costa
Rica, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, and Singapore); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2006
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 121–22, 365, 367,
555,
available
at
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_
Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/ asset_upload_file929_9220.pdf (commenting
on protection of well-known marks in China, Japan, and Russia); see also OFFICE OF
U.S. TRADE REP., 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 76,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file 192_15258.pdf
(“The United States also remains concerned about a variety of weaknesses in
China’s legal framework that do not effectively deter, and may even encourage,
certain types of infringing activity, such as the ‘squatting’ of foreign company names,
designs and trademarks . . . . The United States has continued to discuss these and
other problems with China and seek solutions for them. In a positive development,
SAIC announced in August 2007 that it was launching a 6-month campaign
targeting the unauthorized use of well-known trademarks and company names in
the enterprise registration process.”); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2007 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 48, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file
230_11122.pdf (“The U.S. Government commends the Suzhou Intermediate Court
for recognizing the Kodak well-known trademark status in a court case involving the
Kodak name.”).
64
Another long-standing international agreement, which creates for the United
States significant trademark-related obligations potentially useful for owners of
certain well-known foreign marks, is the General Inter-American Convention for
Trade Mark and Commercial Protection (the “Pan-American Convention”). See
General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection,
Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907 [hereinafter Pan-American Convention]. The PanAmerican Convention, which has been somewhat, but not entirely, eclipsed by the
TRIPS Agreement, has as its current member nations the United States, Colombia,
Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. See
Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 157 n.7 (1940). Under article 7 of
the Pan-American Convention, which is self-executing in the United States, owners
of a mark protected in one member nation may challenge the use and registration of
conflicting trademarks in another member nation upon proof that the junior user,
applicant, or registrant of the mark in question had knowledge of the existence and
continuous use of the senior owner’s use of the mark in the same class of goods. See
id. at 161.
Any owner of a mark protected in one of the Contracting States in
accordance with its domestic law, who may know that some other person is
using or applying to register or deposit an interfering mark in any other of
the Contracting States, shall have the right to oppose such use, registration
or deposit and shall have the right to employ all legal means, procedure or
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III. A HISTORY OF WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN MARKS IN THE UNITED
STATES
Through 2004, U.S. courts uniformly recognized that wellknown foreign marks not used in this country could be protected
here from confusingly similar registrations and unauthorized
uses. Until then, direct recognition of rights in well-known
foreign marks had been most clearly embodied in two New York
State trial court decisions from 1936 and 1959. Those decisions
applied unfair competition and misappropriation doctrines to
allow relief to owners of well-known foreign marks. The doctrine
was not referred to as such in those cases, nor did those courts
refer to article 6bis of the Paris Convention.65

recourse provided in the country in which such interfering mark is being
used or where its registration or deposit is being sought, and upon proof
that the person who is using such mark or applying to register or deposit it,
had knowledge of the existence and continuous use in any of the
Contracting States of the mark on which opposition is based upon goods of
the same class, the opposer may claim for himself the preferential right to
use such mark in the country where the opposition is made or priority to
register or deposit it in such country, upon compliance with the
requirements established by the domestic legislation in such country and
by this Convention.
Pan-American Convention, supra, art. 7. The Pan-American Convention does not
deal explicitly with well-known foreign marks, but it does provide an avenue for
certain owners of foreign marks to obtain relief in the United States against the
knowing use of a conflicting mark. This means that owners of well-known foreign
marks used and protected in a member nation of the Pan-American Convention
have, as a practical matter, greater rights to object to conflicting U.S. uses than do
owners of marks used and protected elsewhere in the world. The Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board has held that the Pan-American Convention provides an
additional basis in U.S. trademark law for certain foreign trademark owners—those
meeting the requirements of the Convention—to maintain or defend an inter partes
opposition or cancellation proceeding with the Patent and Trademark Office. See
Diaz v. Servicios De Franquicia Pardo’s S.A.C., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1324–26
(T.T.A.B. 2007) (holding that article 7 of the Pan-American Convention can be used
to establish the affirmative defense of priority in a trademark within the context of
an opposition); British-Am. Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1585, 1589–90 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (holding that article 8 of the Pan-American
Convention provides an independent basis for a petition to cancel a registered
mark); see also Corp. Cimex, S.A. v. DM Enter. & Distrib., Inc., 2008 WL 5078739, at
*2 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (granting summary judgment to a Cuban opposer in an opposition
based on section 7 of the Pan-American Convention).
65
The first case did refer to article 10bis of the Paris Convention, which states
that member nations must provide “effective protection against unfair competition.”
See Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 554, 288 N.Y.S.
529, 532 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1936).
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Case Law Through 2004

In Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Restaurant & Café, Inc.,66 a
New York court granted relief to the owner of a mark alleged to
have “developed international fame.”67 The mark, “Prunier,” had
been in continuous use in Paris, France for restaurant services
from 1872 through the time of the case in 1936.68 The senior user
had no operations in the United States.69 The restaurants, which
operated under the name “Prunier” and “Maison Prunier,”
specialized in seafood.70 The junior user had opened a restaurant
in New York City under the name “Prunier’s Restaurant & Café,
Inc.” with menus carrying the legend “The Famous French Sea
Food Restaurant.”71
The trial court issued a temporary
injunction against the junior use, although the senior use was
exclusively foreign.72
In Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc.,73 the New York trial court
issued a permanent injunction to protect the senior user’s
“Maxim’s” mark, used for a restaurant in Paris, from a junior use
of the same name for a New York City restaurant.74 As stated by
the court, “There is no doubt as to [the Paris restaurant’s] unique
and eminent position as a restaurant of international fame and
prestige. It is, of course, well known in this country, particularly
to the class of people residing in the cosmopolitan city of New
York who dine out.”75 The senior user had a registration in the
United States for catering services and wines, but the

66

159 Misc. 551, 288 N.Y.S. 529.
Id. at 552, 288 N.Y.S. at 530.
68
Id.
69
See id. at 553, 288 N.Y.S. at 530–31.
70
Id. at 552, 288 N.Y.S. at 530. The current online restaurant guides for Paris
indicate that a restaurant called “Maison Prunier,” which features an oyster bar,
continues to operate there. See Zagat Survey LLC, Paris Restaraunts Maison
Prunier,
http://www.zagat.com/Verticals/PropertyDetails.aspx?VID=8&R=69730
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
71
Maison Prunier, 159 Misc. at 553–54, 288 N.Y.S. at 531 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
72
Id. at 559, 288 N.Y.S. at 538.
73
20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1959).
74
Id. at 758, 760, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334, 336. The defendant also used a similar
color scheme for its décor and imitated a particular script printing of the name
“Maxim’s” on an awning, over the door, and in advertising. See id. at 758, 193
N.Y.S.2d at 334. The script appears to remain the same even today. See, e.g., U.S.
Trademark Reg. No. 580,091 (filed Mar. 20, 1952); Maxim’s, http://www.maxims-deparis.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
75
Vaudable, 20 Misc. 2d at 758, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
67
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registration did not appear to weigh significantly in the court’s
decision.76 In enjoining the domestic use, the court emphasized
the defendant junior user’s apparent intent to appropriate the
widespread goodwill that the plaintiffs had built up in the
“Maxim’s” name.77
As noted above, these New York cases did not rely on federal
trademark law or the Paris Convention’s obligation related to
well-known marks, a point emphasized by the Second Circuit in
refusing to recognize federal protection in 2007.78 Failure to refer
to the Lanham Act in the Maison Prunier case is, of course,
completely irrelevant in light of the fact that the Lanham Act
became effective in 1947, eight years after the decision. And
Vaudable, decided only twelve years after the Lanham Act
shifted the emphasis within U.S. trademark law from the state to
the federal level, had no need to make a specific citation to
federal law. The court was able to rely almost entirely on New
York state case law, specifically Maison Prunier.79 Vaudable did
refer to the Lanham Act generally to support its statement that
“[t]he trend of the law, both statutory and decisional, has been to
extend the scope of the doctrine of unfair competition.”80
The doctrine recognizing well-known foreign marks
remained relatively dormant for over forty years, with sporadic
references in the decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board (“TTAB”) and other cases where it was mentioned by a
court in passing. But the doctrine was generally not relied on by
any party to the case, and it did not form the sole basis of any of
the decisions.81 For example, a 1983 TTAB decision declined to
recognize priority in a senior foreign user of a mark as against a
domestic, good-faith junior user, “at least unless it can be shown
that the foreign party’s mark was, at the time of the adoption
and first use of a similar mark by the first user in the United
76

See id.
Id. at 758–59, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334–35.
78
See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007).
79
See Vaudable, 20 Misc. 2d at 759, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
80
Id.
81
See, e.g., Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 102–07 (2d Cir. 1998);
Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1570–72 (Fed. Cir. 1990); First Niagara
Ins. Brokers Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 1345–
46 (T.T.A.B. 2005), overruled on other grounds by First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v.
First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007); All England Lawn
Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1069, 1072
(T.T.A.B. 1983).
77
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States, a ‘famous’ mark within the meaning of Vaudable v.
Montmartre, Inc.”82 The marks in that case were not alleged to
have been “famous” or “well known” or otherwise to have a
significant consumer reputation, so the TTAB did not further
address the issue. Another 1983 TTAB decision rested on two
bases: first, that opposer, All England Lawn Tennis Club, owned
a U.S. registration for the mark WIMBLEDON for wearing
apparel and that the applicant’s proposed mark would create a
likelihood of confusion with that registered mark, and second,
that opposer had acquired rights in the term WIMBLEDON in
the United States in connection with its annual tennis
championship and that the term had acquired “fame and
notoriety [in the United States] . . . within the meaning of
Vaudable.”83
B.

Case Law from 2004 to the Present

In late 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued the first in a flurry of
well-known foreign marks decisions. Its decision allowed a
foreign senior user of a mark to assert priority over a domestic
junior user of a mark by relying on the mark’s well-known status,
based on use outside the United States, as of the time of adoption
of the mark by the junior user.84 Grupo Gigante operated a
grocery-store chain in Mexico under the store name “Gigante.”85
The chain expanded from one Mexico City store in 1962 to almost
one hundred stores by 1991.86 Six stores were in the Baja area of
Mexico, and two of those stores were in Tijuana, located on the
U.S.-Mexican border near San Diego, California.87 The Mexican
company operated no stores in the United States before 1999.88
82

Mother’s Rests. Inc. v. Mother’s Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1046, 1048 (T.T.A.B. 1983). A second opinion in that case, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, opined that “application of the well-known marks doctrine
depends upon whether the applicable text of the Paris Convention, in this case, the
1934 London text, and, in particular, Article 6bis of that Convention, is selfexecuting,” although the opinion agreed that the marks in question had never been
well known in the United States. Id. at 1051–52 (Allen, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
83
All England Lawn Tennis Club, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1071–72.
84
See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.
2004).
85
Id. at 1091.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1092.
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In mid-1991, Michael Dallo opened a grocery store in San
Diego called “Gigante Market,” and in 1996, he and his brother
Chris opened a second area store under the same name.89 In
1998 and 1999, the Dallos and Grupo Gigante began their legal
skirmish, and Grupo Gigante sued for trademark infringement.90
The Ninth Circuit, upon reviewing the district court’s judgment
recognizing potential rights in a well-known foreign mark, began
by holding that the well-known marks doctrine did exist in the
United States:
We hold . . . that there is a famous mark exception [which the
Ninth Circuit equated with a well-known mark exception] to the
territoriality principle. While the territoriality principle is a
long-standing and important doctrine within trademark law, it
cannot be absolute. An absolute territoriality rule without a
famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and
fraud. Commerce crosses borders. In this nation of immigrants,
so do people. Trademark is, at its core, about protecting against
consumer confusion and “palming off.” There can be no
justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into
thinking that they are buying from the store they liked back
home.91

The Ninth Circuit did not specify where in the rather large body
of federal trademark law it located this protection.92
In applying the exception for a well-known mark, allowing
the foreign senior user of the mark to assert priority over a
domestic junior user, the Ninth Circuit set what might be termed
a “secondary meaning plus” standard for which marks could be
protected in the United States as well-known foreign marks.93 It
89

Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
91
Id. at 1094.
92
It did rely, almost certainly, on federal law, since it expressly rejected the
plaintiff’s alternative arguments based on California state law and on the Paris
Convention. It stated that a direct claim under article 6bis would be duplicative of
the Lanham Act claim. Id. at 1099.
93
“Secondary meaning” means that consumers in the relevant market—whether
the market is defined by geography or types of goods or services or some other form
of market segmentation—see a word, name, or symbol used in connection with goods
or services and think first of the brand or source significance of the mark rather
than the primary, or “dictionary” or other common meaning, of a word, name, or
symbol. See Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 237 (5th Cir.
2010). Some authorities prefer to refer to secondary meaning by the term “acquired
distinctiveness” in order to more clearly differentiate this type of trademark
distinctiveness from “inherent distinctiveness.” See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
90
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held that “where the mark has not before been used in the
American market, the court must be satisfied, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial percentage of
consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the
foreign mark.”94
The court expressly limited the relevant
American market to the geographic area of the defendant’s
allegedly infringing use.95 The concurring opinion in Grupo
Gigante agreed with the legal standard announced, but it also
explained in some detail why the evidence available in the case
did not meet that standard. The concurring judge believed that
for the grocery store services at issue, survey evidence related
only to “Spanish-speaking [persons who] had recently purchased
Mexican-style food at a supermarket or other food store”—the
only survey presented by the senior user—would never be
sufficient because the survey emphasized the target market of
Spanish-speaking grocery purchasers rather than the general
category of the service provided, namely, retail grocery store
services.96 Moreover, the concurring judge carefully set forth his
view that a majority of the junior user’s customers and potential
customers must be familiar with the foreign mark before wellknown status can be found for that foreign mark.97

Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 205–06 (2000). Marks that are inherently
distinctive are protected under U.S. law from the time of use or registration, while
non-inherently distinctive marks are not protected until they develop secondary
meaning or acquired distinctiveness among consumers through use in the relevant
market. See Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. TD Banknorth, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 77,
84 (D. Mass. 2008). There is no specific standard for the level of familiarity required
among consumers before secondary meaning will be found by the courts or the
trademark office.
94
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1107 (Graber, J., concurring) (quoting Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v.
Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2000)).
97
Id. at 1108. In the case, despite the Ninth Circuit’s leaving open the
possibility that the plaintiff’s “Gigante” mark could be found to have been well
known, the victory was only partial for Grupo Gigante. The court also applied the
doctrine of laches to refuse to grant an injunction against the use of the “Gigante
Market” mark at the two existing Dallo locations. See id. at 1101–05 (majority
opinion). The remaining open issue was whether the plaintiff, owner of the foreign
mark, would be able to enjoin the Dallos from opening a future location. See id. at
1093.

CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:14 PM

1372

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1347

Also in 2004, the Southern District of New York held that
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act98 provided protection to the
owner of a foreign mark that was well known in the United
States as of the time of the defendant’s adoption of the mark.99
In Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,100 although a
Cuban cigar manufacturer was the senior user of the mark
“Cohiba,” a domestic junior user had registered the mark in the
United States and had used it in connection with cigars at
various times over a fifteen-year period before the immediate
legal dispute had begun in earnest.101 The court referenced the
common law “well-known” or “famous marks” doctrine as well as
article 6bis of the Paris Convention, and it declared that the 6bis
rights were “subsumed by federal and common law.”102 The court
referenced Vaudable and TTAB decisions referencing Vaudable,
as well as the treatise McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, to determine that “Cubatabaco need only show that
the COHIBA mark had a ‘known reputation’ to premium cigar
smokers” at the time of the defendant’s adoption of the mark.103
The court then looked to the World Intellectual Property
Organization’s Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on
the Protection of Well-Known Marks104 for guidance in applying a
standard for well-known marks to the facts before it.105 Upon
deciding that the “Cohiba” mark was well known, or famous,
within the meaning of the doctrine, it found that the plaintiff
senior user had a protectable right in the mark at the relevant

98
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). Section 43(a) provides, in relevant part, that the
use in commerce,
on or in connection with any goods or services, . . . [of] any word, term,
name, symbol, or device . . . which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
[provides a civil cause of action to] any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Id.
99
See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399, 2004 WL
602295, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004).
100
Id. at *1.
101
See id.
102
Id. at *30 (quoting Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ.
8399, 2002 WL 31251005, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2002)).
103
Id. at *33–34.
104
See supra notes 54–64 and accompanying text.
105
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 2004 WL 602295, at *34–35.
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time, and it proceeded to apply a standard likelihood of confusion
analysis under section 43(a).106 The court found the junior use
likely to cause confusion and cancelled the junior user’s
registration.107
When the Empresa Cubana case reached the Second Circuit,
however, the senior user’s victory proved short-lived. Although
the court recognized and left open the possibility that well-known
foreign marks were protected in the United States, it barred
Cubatabaco, the plaintiff in the case, from using the doctrine to
acquire trademark rights in the United States, basing its
decision on the Cuban embargo regulations, stating
Cubatabaco may be correct that Sections 44(b) and (h)
incorporate article 6bis and allow foreign entities to acquire
U.S. trademark rights in the United States if their marks are
sufficiently famous in the United States before they are used in
this country.
That is the view expressed by some
commentators . . . .
However, we need not decide that broad question here because
even assuming that the famous marks doctrine is otherwise
viable and applicable, the embargo bars Cubatabaco from
acquiring property rights in the U.S. COHIBA mark through
the doctrine.108

In two separate 2005 decisions, the Southern District of New
York again served as the forum for the question of protecting
well-known marks in the United States. The court in ITC Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc.109 assumed without deciding that such protection
was available.110 It then stated that at a minimum, the owner of
a foreign mark alleged to be well known in the United States
must demonstrate that the mark had secondary meaning for the
foreign owner in the United States market at the time the junior
use began.111 The court determined that the senior user of the
“Bukhara” mark for restaurant services had not demonstrated
the existence of secondary meaning in the relevant market of

106

Id. at *39.
Id.
108
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 480–81 (2d Cir.
2005) (citations omitted).
109
373 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
110
See id. at 287.
111
See id. The court also noted that the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Grupo
Gigante would require more familiarity among the consuming public than mere
secondary meaning. See id. at 288.
107
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New York City.112 The court therefore denied the claims based on
the alleged status of the mark as a well-known foreign mark.113
The court also found that although the senior user possessed a
U.S. registration for its mark and had previously owned U.S.
trademark rights based on use of the mark in U.S. commerce, it
had abandoned its U.S. rights after closing the restaurants for
which the mark was used.114
Six months later, in Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat
Market, Inc.,115 another judge in the same district expressly held
that federal trademark law does not protect well-known foreign
marks:
To the extent the doctrine is a creature of common law it may
support state causes of action, but it has no place in federal law
where Congress has enacted a statute, the Lanham Act, that
carefully prescribes the bases for federal trademark claims. The
Lanham Act nowhere specifies the well-known or famous marks
doctrine.116

112

See id. at 288–89.
See id. at 290–91.
114
See id. at 284–85.
115
381 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
116
Id. at 327 (citations omitted). The Almacenes Exito Court relied on the
Empresa Cubana Second Circuit opinion in rejecting the argument that section 44(b)
of the Lanham Act incorporated article 6bis protection for domestically unused
marks. See id. at 328. This was, quite simply, an incorrect application of the Second
Circuit’s Empresa Cubana opinion—although it ultimately accurately predicted the
Second Circuit’s later holding in ITC. In Empresa Cubana, the Second Circuit had
rejected an argument by the plaintiff seeking an expanded right against unfair
competition based on Paris Convention article 10bis—not based on 6bis. See
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2005).
The Second Circuit expressly left open the possibility that protection would be
available for well-known foreign marks. See id. at 480–81.
Section 44(b) provides that nationals of Paris Convention member states “shall
be entitled to the benefits of . . . section [44] under the conditions expressed herein to
the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise
entitled by this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2006) (emphasis added). In rejecting a
separate unfair competition claim based on article 10bis of the Paris Convention, as
incorporated by section 44(b) and section 44(h) of the Lanham Act, the Second
Circuit in Empresa Cubana focused on the lack of particular substantive standards
for a broad unfair competition claim within the Lanham Act, which itself only covers
certain types of unfair competition (primarily trademark infringement and false
advertising). See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 484–85. Thus, the court’s reasoning
in the article 10bis context cannot be applied to the question of Lanham Act
implementation of article 6bis, which is expressly a trademark-related claim.
Cubatabaco cannot maintain a claim for unfair competition under Article
10bis of the Paris convention pursuant to Sections 44(b) and (h) of the
113
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Although the court rejected a federal claim, it allowed the foreign
senior user to proceed with its New York state law claims,
relying on Maison Prunier.117
When the Second Circuit reached its initial decision in the
ITC appeal in 2007, it ended most, although not all, doubt as to
the state of the law in that circuit as to well-known foreign
marks.118 ITC lost its effort to obtain federal protection for its
Bukhara mark at the district court level for two main reasons:
(1) The court had determined that ITC abandoned through nonuse its U.S. priority based on its registered mark, and (2) the
court did not believe the mark met the standard for a well-known
foreign mark.119 The Second Circuit confirmed the abandonment

Lanham Act. The Paris Convention requires that “foreign nationals . . . be
given the same treatment in each of the member countries as that country
makes available to its own citizens.” “[T]he Paris Convention provides for
national treatment and does not define the substantive law of unfair
competition.” As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
We agree that section 44 of the Lanham Act incorporated, to some
degree, the Paris Convention. But we disagree that the Paris
Convention creates substantive rights beyond those independently
provided in the Lanham Act. As other courts of appeals have noted, the
rights articulated in the Paris Convention do not exceed the rights
conferred by the Lanham Act. Instead, we conclude that the Paris
Convention, as incorporated by the Lanham Act, only requires
‘national treatment.’
. . . Plaintiff may seek protection in United States courts for violations
of the Lanham Act. But the Paris Convention, as incorporated by
section 44 of the Lanham Act, creates no new cause of action for unfair
competition. Any cause of action based on unfair competition must be
grounded in the substantive provisions of the Lanham Act.
Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 484–85 (quoting Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café
Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2001)) (citations omitted).
117
See Almacenes Exito, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 328. In Almacenes Exito, the junior
user adopted a precise copy of the senior user’s EXITO mark—including design
features. Id. at 326. The senior user operated the largest retail superstore chain in
Colombia, as well as stores in Venezuela. Id. The junior user applied the mark to
local supermarkets—featuring Latin American produce—in upper Manhattan and
the Bronx, in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. Id.
118
For another case involving claims of well-known status, see DeBeers LV
Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
119
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 285–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
aff’d, 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
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finding.120 It also refused to allow ITC recourse to the wellknown foreign mark doctrine to obtain a different form of
trademark priority over the defendants with respect to the
Bukhara mark.121
In refusing to follow the only appellate decision on point, the
Second Circuit accurately observed, “[i]n Grupo Gigante, the
Ninth Circuit did not reference either the language of the
Lanham Act nor [sic] Article 6bis of the Paris Convention to
support recognition of the famous marks doctrine.”122 The court
concluded that the Ninth Circuit had rested its decision solely on
“sound policy.”123
Then, following a review of the recent Southern District of
New York decisions on the well-known foreign marks doctrine,
the Second Circuit endorsed the approach of the Almacenes Exito
Court.124 In that decision, the well-known foreign marks doctrine
was deemed to be an unacceptably “radical change in basic
federal trademark law” due to its conflict with “the territoriality
principle [which is] ‘a bedrock principle of federal trademark
law.’ ”125
The court appeared to be most convinced by its own reading
of section 44 of the Lanham Act:
[W]e do not ourselves discern in the plain language of sections
44(b) and (h) a clear congressional intent to incorporate a
famous marks exception into federal unfair competition law.
Section 44(b) guarantees foreign mark holders only “the benefits
of this section . . . to the extent necessary to give effect to
any . . . convention, treaty or reciprocal law,” as well as the
“rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by
this chapter.” In short, whatever protections Article 6bis and
Article 16(2) [of the TRIPS Agreement] might contemplate for
famous marks, section 44(b) grants foreign mark holders
covered by these treaties only those protections of United States
law already specified in the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act’s
unfair competition protections, as we have already explained,
are cabined by the long-established principle of territoriality.126
120

See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007).
See id. at 154.
122
Id. at 160.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 160–61.
125
Id. at 161 (quoting Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc., 381
F. Supp. 2d 324, 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
126
Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
121
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The court observed that Congress has amended the Lanham Act
numerous times since the original enactment in 1946, and the
court ruled that without further revision, it would not recognize
the well-known marks doctrine under federal law.127
127
Id. at 164. In its opinion, the court also certified to the New York Court of
Appeals two questions regarding the status of protection of well-known foreign
marks under New York state law. See supra note 13.
Since the Second Circuit issued its 2007 ITC decision, the TTAB has ceased to
recognize what it previously termed the “famous mark doctrine,” which “entitled [a
foreign party] to priority if it can show that its mark was, at the time of the adoption
and first use of a similar mark by the first user in the United States, a ‘famous’
mark among relevant purchasers in the United States.” Compare London Reg’l
Transp. v. William A. Berdan & Edward C. Goetz, III P’ship, 2006 WL 2032540, at
*10 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (recognizing the doctrine using the quoted language and relying
on a variety of earlier cases, including Mother’s Restaurants and Grupo Gigante),
with Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1591
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (refusing to follow Grupo Gigante or to recognize a well-known
foreign mark claim by way of sections 44(b) and 44(h), or to recognize a claim
directly based on article 6bis of the Paris Convention, and instead following the ITC
decision and its reasoning) and Fiat Group Auto. S.p.A. v. ISM, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1111, 1113 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (stating that the “ ‘well known mark’ doctrine is a
minority view which provides no independent federal cause of action and no
additional substantive rights beyond those found in the Lanham Act,” and relying
largely on ITC to support its view that the Lanham Act does not recognize the
doctrine).
Despite its refusal to continue to recognize a well-known foreign mark or famous
mark exception in support of a claim for cancellation, the TTAB in Bayer Consumer
Care AG, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, denied a registrant’s motion to dismiss the
cancellation claim based on the grounds in section 14(3) that the registrant was
using a mark to “misrepresent the source” of goods. Id. at 1592 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The cancellation petitioner, whose use appeared to be solely in
foreign commerce, provided a photographic comparison of the parties’ packaging,
and the Board appears to have found the packaging to be sufficiently similar to
support a claim of misrepresentation and to survive the motion to dismiss. Id.
In addition, in Petróleos Mexicanos v. Intermix S.A., 2010 WL 5574284 (T.T.A.B.
2010), the TTAB denied registrant Intermix’s motion to dismiss a cancellation action
where it was based, in part, on a claim that the registration of PEMEX created a
false suggestion of a connection with a person or institution, namely petitioner
Petróleos Mexicanos itself, in violation of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. The TTAB
ruled that because the false suggestion was alleged to arise as a result of consumer
familiarity with petitioner’s Mexican and U.S. business activities in connection with
the PEMEX mark, the allegations were sufficient to create standing, even though
petitioner did not allege that it had used the PEMEX mark in commerce in a way
that would create trademark rights in the U.S. Id. at *5. The only specific U.S.
business activity cited by the petitioner was the selling of PEMEX securities in the
U.S. Although petitioner’s assertions that its “PEMEX name, mark, and identity
[were] famous and renowned” and its repeated references to widespread use in
Mexico, leading to knowledge by U.S. consumers, id. at *2–3, would make this case
ripe for analysis in the manner I suggest for a well-known foreign mark, the
petitioner did not clearly attempt to rest its case on PEMEX’s status as a wellknown foreign mark under the Paris Convention, Grupo Gigante, or otherwise.
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Critique of the Case Law

Most of these recent decisions indicate a fundamental
misunderstanding about both the meaning and the significance
of the “territoriality principle.” The Ninth Circuit decision
recognizing the well-known marks doctrine in spite of the court’s
expressed territoriality concerns is an exception to some extent
but even it overstates the need for an “exception” to territoriality
rather than an integration of domestic and international
principles.128 Moreover, the courts appear to underestimate the
content and force of our international treaty obligations as well
as the scope of sections 43(a) and 44 of the Lanham Act. Several
decisions fail to account for the common law’s role in providing
substance to federal trademark law.129 The Lanham Act affirms
and relies upon common law principles of trademark
protection;130 except when expressly stated, it does not supersede
those underlying principles.
The result has been a
misunderstanding of the interaction of common law trademark
principles and international obligations with the Lanham Act’s
broader protections against certain forms of unfair competition.
IV. LANHAM ACT IMPLEMENTATION OF WELL-KNOWN MARK
PROTECTION
This Part explains why and how the owner of a well-known
foreign mark may bring a cause of action for trademark
infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Most of
section 43(a), like the rest of the U.S. law of unfair competition,
focuses on trademark protection in order to meet two underlying
goals: (1) supporting a trademark owner’s investment in a mark
128
See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir.
2004) (stating that the Paris Convention’s principle of independence of registrations
from country to country “arguably requires . . . [preservation of] the territoriality
principle in some form”). But at least the Ninth Circuit separately considered
international and domestic territoriality issues. Id. at 1097.
129
See, e.g., supra quotation in text accompanying note 116. The Second Circuit
repeated the quoted language from the Almacenes Exito case in its first ITC decision.
ITC, 482 F.3d at 161.
130
See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Common Law and Trade Marks in
an Age of Statutes, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR DAVID VAVER 331 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1502282 (explaining and commenting on the dependence
of the Lanham Act on continued judicial development of trademark principles in a
common law fashion, and arguing that this continued development was intended by
Congress and has been accepted by the Supreme Court in its decisions).
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and reputation by giving a right of action to stop confusingly
similar uses; and (2) avoiding consumer confusion in order to
But neither goal requires direct
protect consumers.131
competition between two parties to an unfair competition
dispute.132 And neither goal requires a trademark-based unfair
competition claim to rely on a senior use of a trademark in the
same locality as the allegedly infringing junior use.
Part IV.A below explains the interaction between sections
43(a), 44(b), and 44(h), three of the Lanham Act subsections that
implement the international trademark obligations of the United
States. Part IV.B expands further on this issue through the lens
of the constitutional, statutory, and prudential standing
doctrines. Part IV.C demonstrates how the policy underlying
domestic trademark law supports applying section 43(a) to wellknown foreign marks. The recognition of rights in certain wellknown foreign marks under U.S. law finds support in the
traditionally territorial theory of both domestic law and
international trademark rights and agreements. This support
exists, notwithstanding that “territoriality of rights” is the
doctrine most strenuously raised as an impediment to the
application of the well-known marks doctrine. And finally, Part
IV.D discusses some of the costs of protecting well-known foreign
marks and suggest how those costs can be minimized.
A.

Implementation via Sections 43(a), 44(b), and 44(h)

It is well settled that a domestic senior user of a mark may
obtain protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for
infringement of an unregistered mark if a junior user creates a
likelihood of confusion.133 That protection exists even if the
confusion is likely to arise in a geographic area where the senior
131
See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–48, 1860–66 (2007) (surveying both older case
law and more recent scholarship and finding support for the argument that both
goals motivate the rules within and application of trademark law, although
concluding that the producer interests outweighed the consumer interest in most
historical cases). A third goal of trademark law, to promote free competition, is also
cited to support certain features of trademark law, such as the prohibition on
providing trademark rights in generic terms or descriptive terms that have not
gained secondary meaning. See id. at 1845.
132
See id. at 1899–904.
133
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000); see
also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 27:14 (including citations from all regional federal
circuits).
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user has not yet used the mark, as long as the senior user has
earned a reputation among the relevant consuming public in that
area.134 A likelihood of confusion between a junior use of a mark
and a senior use leads to unfair competition actionable under
section 43(a), even without direct competition between those
users.135
The text of section 43(a) does not differentiate between
domestic and foreign marks. Read both for plain meaning and in
light of its theoretical basis and congressional purpose, it
provides protection for well-known foreign marks in much the
same way that it provides protection to unregistered domestic
marks. Section 43(a) provides, in relevant part:
(a) Civil action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, . . .
....
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
such act.136

Nowhere in the statutory language is a requirement that a
claim of likelihood of confusion must arise from a prior domestic
use of a trademark.137 In other words, section 43(a) does not
require a senior trademark use within the United States.138 It
134

See infra Part IV.C.1.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
136
Id.
137
See DeBeers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., 440 F.
Supp. 2d 249, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don’t I Know You
from Somewhere? Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks that Are
Well Known But Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1398 (2008).
138
But see DeBeers, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (“Although the language of Section
43(a) imposes a requirement of ‘use[ ] in commerce’ only on the party who is alleged
to have infringed an unregistered mark, courts impose the same requirement on
plaintiffs who claim such infringement.” (quoting DeBeers LV Trademark Ltd. v.
135
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only requires that the complaining party prove that a “use[ ] in
commerce [of] any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof” is “likely to cause confusion” within the
United States “as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
[the complained-of party] with [the complaining party], or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [complained-of party’s]
goods, services, or commercial activities by [complaining
party].”139
The focus of the statute is not on the nature of the
complaining party’s use of any word, name, or other device. The
focus is instead on whether the complained-of use creates or is
likely to create a confusing effect within the United States—and
whether that confusing effect relates to a relationship between
the goods, services, or commercial activities of two unrelated
parties. The party with the right to complain of the confusing
effect is not the confused party, but is instead the party whose
commercial reputational interest, including but not limited to a
competitive, economic interest, is being or will be harmed by the
confusion.140 Section 43(a) as a general matter does not require
trademark use in the same way that the rules governing
registration of marks require use; section 43(a) is broad enough
to encompass a wider range of unfair competition than mere
trademark infringement or false advertising.141 The statutory
DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4099(DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005)); LaLonde, supra note 137, at 1379–80 (arguing that a
trademark can be enforced in the United states when it has never been used there
“only in certain jurisdictions and under narrowly defined circumstances”).
It bears notice that in the cancellation context under Lanham Act section 14, the
TTAB also does not require domestic use in commerce of a mark—or trademark
ownership—by the complaining party, in order for that party to possess standing to
pursue an action. See supra note 127.
139
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); see Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 284–85
(1952).
140
See infra text accompanying notes 154–76 (discussing the question of
standing under section 43(a)).
141
By way of example, one can consider the widely accepted cause of action for
false endorsement under section 43(a). The nature of the false endorsement claim, as
it currently exists under section 43(a), demonstrates the lack of a senior trademark
use requirement within section 43(a). See Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093,
1107–10 (9th Cir. 1992). False endorsement actions protect a person’s or entity’s
right to prohibit a third party from falsely implying to consumers that the person or
entity has endorsed the third party or its goods or services, whether the false
endorsement is communicated through words, images, sounds, or other means. See
id. at 1110. A false endorsement claim may be raised under section 43(a) even when
the complaining party has never commercialized his, her, or its name or image
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language includes a range of activities that may result in a
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception as to affiliation,
connection, association, origin, sponsorship, or approval.
Continuing a basic, unadorned interpretation of section
43(a)’s statutory language demonstrates how owners of wellknown foreign marks are included within the scope of
appropriate complaining parties. The statute refers only to “any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged.”142 Courts have understandably restricted “any person
who believes” to include only those persons who reasonably
believe they are likely to be damaged, meaning those with a
“reasonable interest to be protected” by the statute.143 This
restriction includes owners of well-known foreign marks when
those marks have earned a reputation for the owner within a
U.S. market, even when that reputation has been gained by
means other than local use. The statute and court decisions
require only that the reasonable belief of harm arise from the
“use[ ] in commerce [of a] word, term, name, symbol, or
device . . . which is likely to cause confusion . . . as to [an]
affiliation, connection, or association,”144 which confusion could

certainly arise between an owner of the well-known foreign mark
and a domestic user of that mark. No part of the text of section
43(a) excludes such an owner.

through a trademark or trademark-like use of that name or image. See id. at 1109;
cf. Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (C.D. Cal.
2003). A plaintiff is not required to actually use its own name or image in U.S.
commerce in order to bring a valid section 43(a) claim. See, e.g., Trump Plaza of the
Palm Beaches Condo. Ass’n v. Rosenthal, No. 08-80408-CIV, 2009 WL 1812743, at
*11 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s trademark dilution and
cybersquatting claims for lack of standing because plaintiff was not the owner of the
TRUMP PLAZA mark, but refusing to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for false
association or affiliation based on defendant’s use of that mark).
142
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
143
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108 (quoting Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th
Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortg.
Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Johnson & Johnson v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Johnson & Johnson, 631 F.2d at 190 (quoting 1 RUDOLF CALLMAN, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARK AND MONOPOLIES § 18.2(b), at 625 (3d ed. 1967))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
144
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
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Sections 44(b) and 44(h) were included in the Lanham Act to
ensure that foreign trademark owners are allowed to obtain
redress under section 43(a) and the rest of the Lanham Act under
the same conditions as U.S. owners.145 Compared to other
provisions of the Lanham Act, these portions of section 44 are
relatively spare of specific substantive rights.146 But in light of
the design of the section, that approach is entirely logical.
Congress wished for foreign nationals to obtain the same rights
and remedies as U.S. nationals, and it intended to fully
implement, or exceed, all minimum rights required by the
international obligations of the United States.147 By providing
145
See S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274,
1276 (indicating that Congress intended the Lanham Act “[t]o carry out by statute
our international commitments to the end that American traders in foreign
countries may secure the protection to their marks to which they are entitled”
because “[i]ndustrialists in this country have been seriously handicapped in securing
protection in foreign countries due to our failure to carry out, by statute, our
international obligations”).
146
See 15 U.S.C. § 1126. Section 1126 states, in part:
(b) Benefits of section to persons whose country of origin is party to
convention or treaty.
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty
relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of
unfair competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends
reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled
to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the
extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is
otherwise entitled by this chapter.
....
(h) Protection of foreign nationals against unfair competition.
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the
benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to
effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided
in this chapter for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they
may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition.
Id.; see also infra notes 148, 151.
147
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The section states:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged
in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and
deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide
rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the
United States and foreign nations.
Id.
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that foreign nationals may utilize Lanham Act provisions on the
same terms as domestic nationals, rather than crafting all new
provisions applicable only to foreign nationals, Congress ensured
that consistent treatment would be provided to both groups
regardless of changes in the underlying domestic statutes or the
judicial decisions applying them.148 The rights available to
foreign nationals “piggyback,” in a sense, off of the text, the case
law, and the theory of the remainder of federal trademark law.149
The breadth of section 43(a) and the specific language of sections
44(b) and 44(h)150—which together provide foreign owners access
to section 43(a)’s breadth151—shows that the Lanham Act itself
148
Following the express connections created by section 44, we can see that
foreign nationals have equivalent standing to domestic owners. Section 44(b) gives
select foreign nationals the benefits of the remainder of section 44. See id. § 1126(b).
Section 44(b)–(f) collectively provides access to the U.S. trademark registration
system. See id. § 1126(b)–(f). The use of section 32 to obtain protection against
infringement of a registered trademark depends on the ability of a foreign national
to become the owner of a registered mark by way of section 44(b)–(f) and section 1.
Section 44(h) provides foreign nationals with rights against unfair competition
that go beyond ownership of registered rights. Within the scope of section 44(h)’s
unfair competition protection is the ability to raise claims for unfair competition
under section 43(a), as well as those actions provided in section 43(b)–(d) for import
control, trademark dilution, and cybersquatting. See id. § 1126(h). The protection
against unfair competition provided by section 43(a) includes the ability to bring a
cause of action for false advertising, false endorsement, or false affiliation or
association. See id. § 1125(a).
149
Only section 44(c)–(e) creates separate mechanisms for use by foreign
nationals—providing, for example, that foreign nationals who have obtained a
registration for a mark in their country of origin may register that mark in the
United States without providing that the mark is in use in commerce. See
id. § 1126(c)–(e).
150
See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4 (arguing that protection for wellknown foreign marks is incorporated into U.S. law through sections 43(a), 44(b), and
44(h) because 44(b) provides access to protection, 44(h) provides substantive rights
coextensive with the protection owed to foreign nationals under relevant trademark
treaties, and 43(a) gives the foreign nation without a registration standing to sue);
see also Andrew Cook, Article, Do as We Say, Not as We Do: A Study of the WellKnown Marks Doctrine in the United States, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
412, 422–24, 426–28 (2009) (arguing, following the reasoning of the McCarthy
treatise, that protection is currently available under a theory that knowledge of a
well-known mark provides it constructive priority in the area of knowledge, yet
advocating that the resolution to the circuit split is to explicitly incorporate
protection into the Lanham Act).
151
Unsettled is the question of whether section 44(h) goes beyond its role of
combining with section 44(b) to give foreign nationals a clear statutory cause of
action under the various subsections of section 43 in the manner described above.
Courts are split on whether section 44(h) also provides to foreign nationals a federal
cause of action for unfair competition that is separate from, and goes beyond the
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provides an appropriate and theoretically consistent statutory
cause of action for the owners of well-known foreign marks.152
Courts should not rely on vague, possibly inaccurate, notions
of what aspects of the common law of trademarks were
terms of, section 43. See, e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that section 44(h) gives foreign nationals referred to by
section 44(b) a federal claim coextensive with the substantive provisions of the
relevant trademark treaty, which in that case was a bilateral agreement with
Japan); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 687 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (agreeing that the Lanham Act incorporates the substantive provisions
of the Paris Convention, including article 10bis, by way of sections 44(b) and 44(h));
Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286,
1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that a federal cause of action exists for unfair
competition under the Paris Convention, section 44(b), and section 44(h)); Vanity
Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that the
Lanham Act incorporates only limited protections against unfair competition, not a
broad right as might be available if the Paris Convention were self-executing); see
also J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide
Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 48–50 (1996) (noting that the precise range
of protection provided by section 44 is unclear). In this article I do not address this
open issue, nor do I rely on any arguments related to the self-executing, or non-selfexecuting nature or effect of any portion of the Paris Convention under U.S. law.
152
The Second Circuit’s decision in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234
F.2d 633, has been cited to justify decisions both: (1) asserting that section 44 only
incorporates national treatment from the Paris Convention; and (2) therefore
denying that section 44 of the Lanham Act incorporates any substantive aspects of
the Paris Convention. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 908 (9th
Cir. 2002); Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274,
1278 (11th Cir. 2001). Some of these decisions in fact state—mistakenly—that the
Paris Convention itself contains no substantive provisions. See e.g., Mattel, Inc., 296
F.3d at 908; Int’l Café, S.A.L., 252 F.3d at 1278. But the facts of Vanity Fair do not
bear out such a broad interpretation. In the Vanity Fair case, the plaintiff was
asking the court to apply the substance of the Lanham Act to the defendant’s use of
a trademark that took place wholly, or almost wholly, in Canada. Vanity Fair Mills,
Inc., 234 F.2d at 639, 641. The plaintiff argued for this protection by pointing to
section 44’s mandate of “effective protection against unfair competition,” which
echoes the Paris Convention. See id. at 640, 643 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention requires member nations to provide “effective
protection against unfair competition.” Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 10bis.
With that in mind, the Second Circuit’s ruling that section 44 did not give the
plaintiff a right of action to restrain unfair competition taking place in a foreign
nation is rather limited. It rejects the idea that section 44 applies extraterritorially,
but it does not preclude a finding that section 44 provides foreign trademark owners
with access to other protection against unfair competition that is required by the
Paris Convention and provided in another way within the Lanham Act. Most
specifically, the Vanity Fair decision, when viewed in light of the facts before the
court, in no way indicates that a foreign trademark owner cannot look to section 44
and section 43(a) to provide a right of action against a defendant’s conduct that
takes place wholly within the United States. See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 905–
06, 941–42 (describing the Vanity Fair case and providing analysis of the Vanity
Fair decision similar to that set forth here).
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incorporated by Congress into the Lanham Act.153 Instead, courts
should more carefully address the specific language of the
Lanham Act including which parties can and should be granted
standing to raise a claim.
B.

Standing Under Section 43(a)

Courts do not often frame the issue of justiciable trademark
rights under section 43(a) as a matter of standing, although they
should do so more often.154 The analytical framework of standing
and cases analyzing standing to raise a federal unfair
competition claim under section 43(a) are helpful, however, in
explaining why well-known foreign marks are likewise entitled to
protection under section 43(a). Considering standing helps focus
attention on the statutory language and the zone of interests
protected by that language so that a decision maker may not as
easily be distracted by the red herring of “territoriality.”
153
See, e.g., Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d
324, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (asserting that common law trademark doctrines “may
support state causes of action, but [have] no place in federal law where Congress has
enacted a statute, the Lanham Act, that carefully prescribes the bases for federal
trademark claims” (citation omitted)). I argue that this assertion entirely
misapprehends the interaction between the common law of trademarks and the
Lanham Act, which relies for a significant amount of its effect on the common law,
including the analysis of when a likelihood of confusion may arise and when an
unregistered trademark is enforceable. See Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 602–03.
Moreover, this statement, and others like it, ignore the fact that section 43(a)
provides statutory authority for judicial enforcement of a broad range of unfair
competition claims, including infringement of unregistered marks, false
endorsement, false advertising, and other related actions.
154
Some courts have used standing in well-known foreign marks cases, but they
do not often do so for the trademark portion of the foreign owner’s claims. See, e.g.,
De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., No. 04 Civ.
4099(DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005) (applying standing
principles to deny a defendant’s affirmative defense of lack of standing at an early
stage of the proceedings, thus allowing the plaintiff’s trademark claims to go
forward); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(applying standing principles to deny the plaintiff’s false advertising claim but not
its trademark claim), aff’d, 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008). But see Kerzner Int’l Ltd. v.
Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1044 (D. Nev. 2009) (denying
a motion to dismiss a claim for lack of standing because the plaintiff had not used its
mark in connection with services offered inside the United States by noting that if
the mark had well-known status under Grupo Gigante, the plaintiff would in fact
have standing). Courts regularly examine standing in false advertising cases under
section 43(a). See, e.g., Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165
F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998). As I observe in note 127, supra, the TTAB does
regularly address standing in its review of cancellation proceedings, which are
brought under section 14 rather than section 43(a).
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The question should be whether a foreign trademark owner,
who has not otherwise created trademark rights in the United
States through registration or use, has standing to sue under
section 43(a) to enjoin a junior use in the United States that is
likely to cause consumer confusion as a result of the foreign
mark’s previously earned well-known status in the relevant
market.
As further set forth in Part IV.A above, section 43(a)(1) of the
Lanham Act provides a civil cause of action to “any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by another
person’s use in commerce of any mark that is “likely to cause
confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or association”
between the damaged person and the other person or “as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the other person’s] goods,
services, or commercial activities” by the damaged person.155
Owners of trademarks that have become well known in the
United States through reputation rather than through expansion
from foreign to domestic use have standing to bring an action
under this provision. Standing has three components under U.S.
law: constitutional, prudential, and statutory.156 Owners of wellknown foreign marks with a reputation within the relevant U.S.
market satisfy all of these.
The constitutional standing requirements embody the “case
or controversy” limitation on the federal courts’ authority,
derived from Article III of the Constitution.157 The “case or
controversy” limitation requires that “a plaintiff must, generally
speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that
the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and
that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.”158
In any case under section 43(a), the “injury in fact” is a likelihood
of confusion even if actual confusion is not proven.159 Traceability
in trademark law is typically uncontroversial because the specific
language of the statute, as well as common law requirements,
demand proof that it is the defendant’s use of a word or other
155

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–65 (1997); see also Conte Bros., 165
F.3d at 225 (applying constitutional, prudential, and statutory standing
considerations in a section 43(a) false advertising action).
157
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
158
Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
159
See Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir.
1980).
156
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device that is causing the likelihood of confusion.160
In
trademark law, a successful plaintiff usually obtains an
injunction against the defendant’s infringing use, which
ameliorates the injury of likely confusion.161
Beyond the constitutional limitation on standing, the
“judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction”162 embodied in prudential standing principles also
limit the ability of some plaintiffs to petition a federal court for
redress. The prudential standing principles seek to ensure that
the judicial power is properly invoked in light of the
“limited[ ]role of the courts in a democratic society,”163 in order
“to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the
federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular
claim.”164 While courts do not apply a specific formula or analysis
of particular factors in examining the question of prudential
standing, there are common considerations: (1) a litigant must
“assert his [or her] own legal interests rather than those of third
parties”;165 (2) courts should “refrain from adjudicating ‘abstract
questions of wide public significance’ which amount to
‘generalized grievances’ ”;166 and (3) a litigant’s “grievance must
arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated
by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee
invoked.”167 Courts utilize the prudential standing doctrine
unless Congress expressly abrogates it by statute.168 In the case
160
Id.; see also Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 225 (holding that plaintiff’s complaint
alleging lost sale of motor oil products due to the defendant’s false advertising
satisfied the first two requirements of Article III standing for a Lanham Act claim).
161
See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 631 F.2d at 191. Monetary remedies are
sometimes awarded in successful trademark infringement lawsuits.
162
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll.
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)).
163
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citing Schelsinger v. Reservists to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221–27 (1974)).
164
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979).
165
Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
166
Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Syracuse Hous. Auth., 962 F.2d 1101, 1106 (2d Cir.
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984)).
168
Id. at 163 (“Congress legislates against the background of our prudential
standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.” (citing Block v.
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345–48 (1984)).
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of owners of well-known foreign marks, the owners assert their
own interests in concrete disputes. As a result, the only
prudential standing limitation that might arise in this situation
would arise from the “zone of interests” analysis.
By providing express statutory standing requirements,
Congress can narrow or expand the group of persons who might
otherwise have standing under the prudential standing
doctrine.169 When Congress provides standing requirements, the
analysis of those requirements supersedes the more general
“zone of interests” inquiry, although the two can merge.170 In
section 43(a)(1), Congress provided express statutory standing to
“any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged” by the use in commerce of
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person.171

Although
in
other
circumstances,
particularly
with
environmental statutes’ citizen suit provisions, the Supreme
Court has taken “the term ‘any person’ at face value,”172 courts
need not go so far in section 43(a) in order to include the owners
of foreign well-known marks within the group of potentially
appropriate plaintiffs.173
169

See id.
See id.
171
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
172
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165.
173
Courts presented with the question have almost universally held that a
consumer does not have standing to sue under section 43(a), even though he or she
might be “any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged” by the
confusion engendered by the use of similar marks on similar goods or services. See,
e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1166–76 (3d Cir. 1993) (surveying
cases); Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)
(“Congress’ purpose in enacting § 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair
competition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers
generally and almost certainly without consideration of consumer rights of action in
particular.” (citations omitted)); Loy v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 838 F. Supp.
991, 996–97 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“Since the intent of the Lanham Act is to protect
persons engaged in commerce against unfair competition, the court adopts the view
that a consumer must have a reasonable commercial interest in order to pursue a
Section 43(a) claim.” (citation omitted)). Courts have excluded consumers from the
group of plaintiffs with standing by applying a rule requiring a commercial, or
sometimes even competitive, injury. See Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175 (“[T]he statute
170
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Owners of well-known foreign marks easily fit within the
zone of commercial and competitive interests protected by the
Lanham Act, even when the mark is not currently in domestic
use. Congress even specifically included foreign nationals with
relevant treaty connections within the Lanham Act’s zone of
interests:
(b) Benefits of section to persons whose country of origin is
party to convention or treaty.
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention
or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or
the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States
is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the
United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this
section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent
necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention,
treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any
owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.174

When a junior user endangers the commercial or competitive
interests of the owner of a well-known foreign mark, the owner
must be protected under section 43(a), whether the owner is a
U.S. national or a foreign national. A junior user’s use of the
mark endangers these interests in areas in the United States
where the senior foreign mark is well known, threatening the
goodwill in that mark as well as the broader reputation,
products, services, and commercial activities of the senior owner.
The domestic confusion that might arise could damage the senior
owner’s ability to expand into the United States using the wellknown mark or could so seriously affect the reputation of the
senior owner that the owner would have difficulty operating
successfully in the United States using any other mark.
Owners of well-known foreign marks are soundly included
within those parties having standing to sue under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act.175 Neither the Constitution, nor the statutory
provides a private remedy to a commercial plaintiff who meets the burden of proving
that its commercial interests have been harmed by a competitor’s false
advertising.”). The commercial injury requirement applies to owners of well-known
foreign marks as well.
174
15 U.S.C. § 1126(b).
175
Cf. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4 (arguing for standing under section
43(a) for owners of well-known foreign marks by reference to section 44(h) and its
incorporation of treaty obligations rather than specifically by reference to the zone of
interests protected by section 43(a)); id. § 29:61 (referring only to sections 44(b) and
44(h)); Brandon Barker, The Power of the Well-Known Trademark: Courts Should
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text, nor any expressed intent of Congress would exclude them,
nor would any prudential consideration contemplated by the
judicial doctrines of standing. Objections to the recognition of
rights in well-known foreign marks often arise from an argument
that such recognition would threaten or violate the “territoriality
principle” underlying U.S. trademark law.176 The next Part of
this Article explains why those objections are unfounded.
C.

Territoriality in Trademark Law

As demonstrated in Part III, the “territorial” nature of
trademark law has been cited by courts to justify denying
domestic rights to a well-known foreign mark that has not been
used in the United States.177
The roots of trademark’s
territoriality principle, as well as its content, thus deserve
examination.
Universality of rights, rather than strict
territoriality of rights, held sway within trademark law until the

Consider Article 6bis of the Paris Convention an Integrated Part of Section 44 of the
Lanham Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 363, 373–77 (2006) (arguing that sections 44(b),
44(h), and 44(i), read together, incorporate Paris Convention protection for wellknown foreign marks without referring to section 43(a)); Jeffrey M. Reichard & Sam
Sneed, The Famous Marks Doctrine: A Call for American Courts To Grant
Trademark Rights to Famous Foreign Marks, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 85,
92 (2009) (arguing that “the plain language of Lanham Act Sections 44(b), 44(h), and
44(i) indicates that Article 6bis should be incorporated into United States trademark
law”). But see Tashia A. Bunch, Well-Known Marks Doctrine: Where Do We Go from
Here?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 227, 237 (2008) (concluding that
protection for well-known foreign marks “has no basis in [current] federal trademark
law and courts should not apply the doctrine until Congress adds it to the [Lanham]
Act”); LaLonde, supra note 137, at 1395–96 (“[T]he well-known marks protection in
the TRIPS Agreement has not been implemented in the Lanham Act. . . . Locating in
the Lanham Act a well-known marks exception to the U.S. use requirement takes a
combination of fancy footwork and wishful thinking.”); Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is
Fame Alone Sufficient To Create Priority Rights: An International Perspective on the
Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
739, 767–68, 770, 778 (2006) (arguing that well-known foreign marks are not
protected by federal law and recommending amendment of the Lanham Act).
176
See LaLonde, supra note 137, at 1399 (“Allowing relief under current
Lanham Act language without use of a mark in the United States would be a huge
departure from settled law.”); Weissberger, supra note 175, at 743 (“While
[protection for well-known foreign marks] may be cognizable under state law, it
should not be incorporated into federal law where the Lanham Act and the
territoriality principle are controlling.”).
177
See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 (2d Cir. 2007);
Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326–28
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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1930s.178 With a long view of the development of the law in mind,
it is historically unjustified to assert that territoriality is such a
“bedrock” principle of trademark law that it cannot be
reconsidered and contextualized in certain circumstances.179
Territorial limitations on trademark law are, to be sure,
supported by certain concepts and traditions within trademark
law. Those concepts may be either intrinsic or extrinsic to the
theory of trademark law.180 Territorial limitations are inherent
in common law trademark rights: An owner’s right to prevent
others from using a confusingly similar mark is limited to the
area in which the owner possesses goodwill or reputation.181 And
territorial restrictions to trademark rights that are created
through political bodies, such as national trademark
registrations, which rely on the authority of a nation with
territorially limited sovereign power, are extrinsic.182
No basis for the territoriality of trademark rights, however,
supports the complete exclusion of well-known foreign marks
from the protection against unfair competition provided in the
Lanham Act. Applying the well-known marks doctrine in a way
that protects senior users with no domestic use but with a
domestic reputation promotes rather than diminishes the real
root of the intrinsically territorial nature of a trademark. When
trademark law recognizes and protects the trademark owner’s
reputation and goodwill represented and implicated by a
trademark, thereby protecting both consumer understandings
and producer interests, it protects and recognizes a trademark’s
178
See, e.g., Walter J. Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and
Good Will, 47 VA. L. REV. 733, 734 (1961).
179
See Almacenes Exito, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
180
See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 891–908. I credit Professor Dinwoodie with
inspiring and supporting this portion of my analysis through his logical and
thorough exegesis of the various territorial aspects of trademark law in his article.
181
See id. at 888. Dinwoodie states:
For example, common law trademark rights are territorial because the
intrinsic purpose of trademark law suggests extending (and limiting) rights
to the geographic reach of goodwill. In contrast, registration systems
designed to promote economic expansion derive their territorial character
from their grounding in economic policymaking, effected by institutions
that focus on the regulation or development of discrete economic regions.
And rules regarding the enforcement of trademark rights assume their
territorial quality because of their connection to political institutions with
territorially defined sovereignty.
Id.
182
See id.
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intrinsic socio-cultural aspects that have territorial limitations.
Political bases of territoriality, including concerns for comity
often raised to fight any divergence from the strict territoriality
of intellectual property rights, pose no problem. As explained
further in Part IV.C.2 below, applying section 43(a) to effectuate
the well-known marks doctrine in the United States only
adjudicates the propriety of a junior user’s activity on U.S.
territory. Simply applying the Lanham Act to the use of a mark
that is well known in the United States would not invoke any
rights that may have been awarded to the mark’s owner under
foreign law, nor would it require the extraterritorial application
of U.S. law.
1.

Intrinsic Territoriality

Trademark law aims to protect the reputation and goodwill
of a mark, and thus the mark’s owner, and to protect consumers
from deception and confusion as to the source of goods and
services.183 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects both
registered and unregistered, or common law, marks.184 It has
been used to protect against false endorsement and false
association or affiliation as well, even when the complaining
party does not possess traditional trademark rights.185 It also
provides for a remedy against false and misleading advertising
when such advertising causes injury to competitive interests.186
The primary difficulty courts and commentators seem to have
with extending the protection of section 43(a) to owners of foreign
marks that are well known in the United States is the rule, taken
from domestic cases, that protectable trademark goodwill can
183
There is some debate regarding whether U.S. trademark law protects both
consumers and producers, or whether instead the historical focus has been on
producer interests with consumer effects relevant only to a determination of the
effect on the producer. See McKenna, supra note 131. Nevertheless, both interests—
or at least the effects of a junior use on both consumer understanding and producer
investment—currently motivate and guide trademark decisions, as demonstrated by
the factor analysis for likelihood of confusion and the rhetoric used by courts in
deciding cases. See infra note 224. The effect on consumer understanding was also a
factor in older decisions, and thus on trademark law as it existed at the time the
Lanham Act was created, even if the effect was relevant to the decision only insofar
as it indicated for a court when a competitor had invaded a producer’s protectable
interest. See infra note 224.
184
See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 784 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); McCarthy, supra note 151, at 53–54, 58–59.
185
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
186
See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 151, at 53–54, 56–57.
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only follow the geographic extent of the trade in goods bearing a
trademark.187
The context for the basic domestic territoriality rule was and
continues to be priority disputes between users of similar marks
in fully separate trading areas with no overlap of goodwill or
consumers. Judges should not lightly apply a rule developed for
this situation to a completely different one involving a mark
whose reputation crosses national boundaries.
Well-known
foreign marks present a different set of circumstances, since in
order to qualify as “well known,” a mark must in fact be known
by consumers in the disputed trading area.188 As such, the caveat
to the basic territoriality rule allowing for protection in areas of
reputation as well as areas of use—set forth in more detail
below—is more applicable. This Section fully explores the
domestic “territoriality” doctrine cited by courts in objecting to
the protection of well-known foreign marks, and it explains why
the domestic basis of territoriality, when fully understood, poses
no obstacle to that protection.
a.

Territorial Limits on Trademark Rights

In the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court heard two cases that turned on the rules of priority
governing trademark rights.189 The resulting rule became known
as the Tea Rose doctrine, named after the trademark at issue in
the first of the two cases.190 According to the Court: “Into
whatever markets the use of a trademark has extended, or its

meaning has become known, there will the manufacturer or
trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be entitled to
protection and redress.”191
187

See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007).
See supra Part II.C.
189
See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
190
See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 895 n.26.
191
Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415–16. In addition:
[u]ndoubtedly, the general rule is that, as between conflicting claimants to
the right to use the same mark, priority of appropriation determines the
question. But the reason is that purchasers have come to understand the
mark as indicating the origin of the wares, so that its use by a second
188
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Under the Tea Rose doctrine, courts presume that consumer
associations have been made, and a reputation exists, anywhere
the mark has been used.192 The Supreme Court used this general
statement of the limits of trademark rights to craft an exception
to a general “first in time” rule:
In the ordinary case of parties competing under the same mark
in the same market, it is correct to say that prior appropriation
settles the question. But where two parties independently are
employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in
separate markets wholly remote the one from the other, the
question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant; unless, at
least, it appear that the second adopter has selected the mark
with some design inimical to the interests of the first user, such
as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall
the extension of his trade, or the like.193

It is worth noting that U.S. law has created a slightly
different rule for priority of rights in inherently distinctive marks
as compared to marks that must acquire distinctiveness for
enforceability.194 Simple priority of use in a geographic area
governs rights in inherently distinctive marks.195 But if a mark
is not inherently distinctive, a measure of secondary meaning
must be shown on the part of a senior user before that user can
enjoin a junior use.196
The creation of some consumer
associations is thus arguably required in the case of non-

producer amounts to an attempt to sell his goods as those of his competitor.
The reason for the rule does not extend to a case where the same trademark happens to be employed simultaneously by two manufacturers in
different markets separate and remote from each other, so that the mark
means one thing in one market, an entirely different thing in another. It
would be a perversion of the rule of priority to give it such an application in
our broadly extended country that an innocent party who had in good faith
employed a trade-mark in one state, and by the use of it had built up a
trade there, being the first appropriator in that jurisdiction, might
afterwards be prevented from using it, with consequent injury to his trade
and good will . . . .
United Drug, 248 U.S. at 100 (citations omitted).
192
Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 413–14 (“[T]he right grows out of use, not
mere adoption. . . . In short, the trademark is treated as merely a protection for the
good will, and not the subject of property except in connection with an existing
business.”).
193
Id. at 415.
194
See supra note 93 (explaining inherent and acquired distinctiveness).
195
See supra note 93.
196
See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 16:34 (explaining the priority
rules that apply to secondary meaning).
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inherently distinctive marks, but direct evidence on the specific
geographic extent of those associations is not required.197 And in
many cases, real evidence on the existence of any consumer
association is not required by statute, even when a mark user
seeks a federal registration that will then create nationwide
priority.198 As a result of the rules governing both inherently and
non-inherently distinctive marks and the extent of rights
provided compared to the extent of goodwill that must be
proven—namely, none—any honest assessment of this rule must
admit that it is an imperfect measure.199 It is only a rule of
thumb—a valuable rule of thumb that I do not advocate
overturning at this juncture—but a rough measure
nonetheless.200
197
See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th
Cir. 1987) (holding, in a case of a senior user catering to travelers, that secondary
meaning among a “substantial portion of consumers nationally” would satisfy the
requirement of showing a local reputation in the area of the junior user (citing
Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. Mullen’s Holiday Inn, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Cal.
1968)).
198
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006) (providing for registration of a descriptive
mark that “has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce,” and giving
the trademark office the power to “accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has
become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant’s goods in
commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by
the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of
distinctiveness is made”). Surveys and other forms of market research and consumer
reaction studies are relevant to the determination of acquired distinctiveness, but
there is no rule that requires the surveys to cover consumers within a large swath of
U.S. territory. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.06(d) (2010).
199
Although it is an imperfect measure of the extent of actual consumer
understandings regarding a mark, it might still be an accurate measure of the
extent to which the U.S. Congress wished to provide trademark protections. But
since none of the above-discussed doctrines were expressly incorporated into the
Lanham Act and have remained malleable judge-made law, one cannot make an
ironclad assertion that Congress cemented any particular version of the domestic
territoriality doctrines within the overall scheme of the Lanham Act. And given the
express language of the Lanham Act, I would argue that Congress in fact did not
cement these domestic territoriality doctrines into the Lanham Act in a way that
would override the remainder of the statutory scheme and its incorporation of the
protections required under our international agreements.
200
Cf. Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49
S.C. L. REV. 695, 712–13, 717 (1998) (critiquing reliance on the geographic overlap or
separation of trademark uses, in the context of discussing concurrent uses of marks
on the internet, by arguing that “trademark law is distinctly based upon market
separations, and . . . geographic separations are merely a surrogate or an
approximation for defining the relevant market” and going on to argue that “[b]y
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Despite the long-standing nature of the Tea Rose doctrine
linking goodwill to the geographic area of use, U.S. law does not
countenance an ironclad rule that where the trade has not gone,
no reputation can exist.201 U.S. law recognizes the possibility
that trademark reputation can precede trademark use in some
geographic areas.202 And when reputation does precede use, the
senior trademark user has a protectable interest and is awarded
rights superior to a junior user, even if the junior user was the
first to actually use the mark in the particular geographic area.203
In those circumstances, courts allow the senior user to enjoin the

junior use, even when the senior user has not yet used the mark
in commerce in that area and has no particular plans to begin
use in that area.204
An old and oft-cited example of reputation preceding actual
use in a geographic location is the STORK CLUB case.205 A New
York club used the STORK CLUB mark in connection with a

determining the purpose of geographically based trademark rules, we can adapt
traditional rules to serve the Internet”).
201
Hanover Star Milling did state the rule that way in applying its rule to the
facts of the case, but the general rule quoted above does not preclude the possibility.
That property in a trademark is not limited in its enjoyment by territorial
bounds, but may be asserted and protected wherever the law affords a
remedy for wrongs, is true in a limited sense. Into whatever markets the use
of a trademark has extended, or its meaning has become known, there will
the manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be
entitled to protection and redress. But this is not to say that the proprietor
of a trademark, good in the markets where it has been employed, can
monopolize markets that his trade has never reached, and where the mark
signifies not his goods, but those of another. We agree with the court below
that ‘since it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be protected, a
trademark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or
states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader’s goods have
become known and identified by his use of the mark. But the mark, of itself,
cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no
trader to offer the article.’
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
202
See Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 844; Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp.,
409 F.2d 614, 617 (3d Cir. 1969); Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238,
243 (N.D. Ala. 1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1965).
203
See generally 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26:16–19.
204
See id.
205
Stork Rest. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948).
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fairly upscale establishment.206 Despite lack of actual use outside
New York City, the club obtained an injunction against a
relatively lowbrow San Francisco club that attempted to use the
same mark.207 The court based its decision on the fact that San
Francisco residents would likely know of the New York
That
establishment due to its widespread reputation.208
reputation in San Francisco predated the junior use in San
Francisco, meaning that the junior San Francisco use could cause
confusion.209 So the New York establishment prevailed, even
though the San Francisco user was the first to make actual use of
the mark in San Francisco.
In the absence of direct proof of the extent of goodwill or
reputation, a rule that goodwill, and thus an owner’s protectable
interest, cannot extend beyond the geographic range of use does
operate efficiently. But in this age of easier, more affordable
national and international travel and almost-zero-marginal-cost
global communications networks, knowledge of a mark and its
associated goods and services can easily travel beyond the
geographic reach of actual use.210 U.S. domestic law certainly
recognizes this phenomenon, although most cases present facts
spanning only domestic territory rather than crossing an
international border.211
In creating the Tea Rose rule, the Supreme Court itself
recognized the possibility that a mark might be known in a
geographic area without actual use in that area when it stated:
“Into whatever markets the use of a trademark has extended, or
its meaning has become known, there will the manufacturer or
trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be entitled to
protection and redress.”212
Many courts have ignored the
213
Nevertheless, numerous cases have
emphasized language.
206

Id. at 350.
Id. at 351, 364.
208
Id. at 351, 358–59.
209
Id. at 355.
210
Accord MOSTERT, supra note 44, at 1–6.
211
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 202.
212
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916) (emphasis
added).
213
See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007). But see
Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693–95 (5th Cir.
1995) (noting the language emphasized above from Hanover Star Milling and using
it to support its holding that the trade area for an unregistered mark extends to the
“zone of reputation”).
207
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recognized the principle that reputation can precede use. In
those situations, the courts have barred the junior user from
establishing superior rights in a separate geographic area, even
when that junior user did not himself know of the senior mark.214
The remote, good-faith junior user defense only succeeds in
domestic cases when the senior mark was not known either to
customers or to the junior user at the time of the junior user’s
adoption.215
b.

Territorial Expansions of Trademark Rights

A federal registration provides a mark owner with
constructive use rights nationwide, in the entire territory of the
United States, thus overriding the basic common law rule that
geographically limits rights to the area of actual use or actual
reputation.216 So while the common law corollary to the Tea Rose
rule countenances an expansion of rights beyond the area of use,
but only so far as the reputation extends, this statutory
expansion of trademark rights does not depend at all on either
use or reputation in the expanded area of priority.
Despite statutory nationwide priority in a registered mark, it
is well understood by courts that actual goodwill in the mark
may not exist nationwide.217 And without a current reputation in
a territory, many courts are hesitant to find that confusion may
arise in that territory.218 As a result, those courts have developed
rules governing the availability of judicial relief for owners of
registered marks in areas where the owner cannot show current
goodwill. The primary rule in this regard is the so-called Dawn
Donut rule, discussed below, which is highly relevant to
214
See, e.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d
1111, 1121 (6th Cir. 1996); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 437 F. Supp. 956, 963, 968
(N.D. Cal. 1977), aff’d, 646 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1980); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2,
§§ 26:16–17.
215
See, e.g., GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541–42 (10th Cir. 1990); see
also Woman’s World Shops, Inc. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985,
1988 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (holding, in light of the Hanover Star Milling and United Drug
cases, that adoption of a senior user’s mark by a remote junior user had not created
rights in the junior user because the mark had been adopted with knowledge of the
senior use and thus was not a good faith or innocent adoption, even though the
junior user argued that it had no intent to trade on the senior user’s goodwill in its
mark).
216
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1057(b)–(c) (West 2011); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2006).
217
See, e.g., GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 542.
218
See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364–65
(2d Cir. 1959).
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successfully integrating protection for well-known marks with
the remainder of U.S. trademark law.
c.

Territorial Limits on Trademark Remedies

Current precedent in most of the federal circuit courts
disallows the issuance of an injunction in favor of the owner of a
federal trademark registration in certain circumstances, even if
that owner clearly has registration-based priority in the
defendant’s geographic area of use. These courts will not issue
an injunction if the owner is not currently using the mark within
the defendant’s geographic area, has no plans to begin that use in
the immediately foreseeable future, and has no reputation in that
area in the mind of the relevant consuming public.219 This is
known as the Dawn Donut rule,220 after the Second Circuit’s
decision in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.221 The
rule stems from an application of the requirement of likelihood of
confusion, meaning a present likelihood of confusion, which must
exist for a plaintiff trademark owner to obtain injunctive relief.222
The Second Circuit refused relief to the federal registrant in
Dawn Donut, even in the face of a junior use of an identical mark
for related goods and services, due to a finding that there was no
current or imminent likelihood of confusion in the relevant
market—namely, the marketplace where the defendant
operated.223 This lack of a likelihood of confusion stemmed not
from the court’s analysis of the mark, the goods, the consumers,
or the other now-traditional confusion factors,224 but instead
stemmed from the fact that the registrant had not shown that it
219

See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 26:33–36.
Id.
221
267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
222
Id. at 360.
223
Id. at 364–65 (including both geographic and market-sector limitations on the
plaintiff’s current use when considering the relevant market).
224
See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir.
1961). The factors relevant to confusion include, under the varying formulations
created by each federal circuit court of appeals: (1) similarity between the junior and
senior marks; (2) the strength of the senior user’s mark; (3) the relatedness of the
goods or services offered by the junior and senior users under the marks; (4) the
likelihood that the senior user will bridge any existing gap between the goods or
services of the two users; (5) the sales channels in which the marks are used; (6) the
sophistication of the transaction—or the consumers—in which the parties offer their
goods or services; (7) any proof of actual confusion; and (8) the intent—or good
faith—of the junior user in adopting its mark. See id.; see also Champions Golf Club,
Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1996).
220
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currently operated in the relevant geographic marketplace and
had no plans to do so in the near future.225 The registrant also
could not demonstrate that any consumers in the area associated
it with the mark.226 The court, while denying immediate relief to
the registrant, did note that if the registrant were to make plans
to enter the relevant geographic marketplace, it would be able to
return to court to obtain an injunction at that time.227
Although closely related to the Tea Rose doctrine, which
states that a common law trademark owner does not obtain
trademark rights in any geographical area where the mark is not
in use,228 the Dawn Donut doctrine is distinct. As stated by
Thomas McCarthy, the author of a major trademark treatise, “Of
course, if the federal registrant can prove that its mark already
has established a reputation in the junior user’s territory, then
there is no need for proof of impending entry by an actual sales
outlet, for a likelihood of confusion exists now.”229 The Sixth
Circuit has gone even further than McCarthy, in the context of
national registration rather than common law right, noting that
the Second Circuit’s almost single-minded focus on likelihood of
actual market entry in Dawn Donut may be inappropriate in
certain circumstances. It has plainly stated that a finding of
infringement is based on a multi-factor test and cannot be
defeated by a lack of likelihood of entry alone.230

225

Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364–65.
See id.
227
Id. at 365.
228
See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26:2.
229
Id. § 26:34 (citing Crab Cooker v. Specialty Rests. Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
233 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Consol. Freightways, Inc. v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 524 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Scientific Applications, Inc. v. Energy Conservation
Corp., 436 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ga. 1977)).
230
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir.
1999).
The law of this Circuit holds that no particular finding of likelihood of entry
or irreparable harm is necessary for injunctive relief in trademark
infringement or unfair competition cases. . . . The Sixth Circuit has an
eight point test for infringement liability under the Lanham Act.
Likelihood of entry is just one of the eight factors under this test, and it is
not dispositive of liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
A concurring opinion went even further, calling for reexamination of the Dawn
Donut rule nationwide, based on the observation that “our society is far more mobile
than it was four decades ago [now five decades ago]. For this reason, and given that
recent technological innovations such as the Internet are increasingly
226
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In a sense, the Dawn Donut rule and the Tea Rose doctrine
are both animated by a trademark’s presence in a market or its
probable entry into a market, with current presence of a mark
being defined either by actual sales or by consumer
understanding or reputation. If the senior user’s reputation
exists in the defendant’s trade area at the time of the defendant’s
adoption of the mark, then the senior user should be awarded an
injunction against the junior use.231
d.

Application of Domestic Territoriality to Well-Known Foreign
Marks

An actual reputation for a trademark in a market creates a
protectable interest under section 43(a). At least in the domestic
context, it seems clear that reputation can exist even without
local use of a mark.232 If a reputation exists for a senior user and
a junior use begins, then confusion can exist even without the
senior user’s local use of a mark.
Survey evidence offered in both foreign and domestic case
law demonstrates that reputation and thus consumer
associations can precede the use of a mark in a particular area.233
An international border does not necessarily impede this
reputation-preceding phenomenon.
For example, many
Americans likely were familiar with “Harrods” and “Marks and
Spencer” department store services well before either company
developed any means of accepting orders of goods from the
United States via their internet sites. And although the All
England Lawn Tennis Club has never offered a tennis
deconstructing geographical barriers for marketing purposes, it appears to me that a
re-examination . . . would be timely.” Id. at 1057 (Jones, J., concurring).
231
There are a number of cases applying this principle in the context of a federal
registrant with senior rights to a junior user, when the registrant has a reputation
in the junior trade area, although it has not yet actually begun to do business in that
trade area. See Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 614 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1965); Supershuttle Int’l, Inc. v. Shafer-Schonewill & Assocs., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1762, 1764–65 (D. Colo. 1995); Gastown, Inc. of Del. v. Gastown, Inc., 331 F.
Supp. 626, 632 (D. Conn. 1971); Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238, 241
(N.D. Ala. 1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1965). A case including an
international border is Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
697, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977).
232
See supra Part IV.C.1.a.
233
See, e.g., Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1102
(9th Cir. 2004); McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Rest., 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA),
at
50–60
(S.
Afr.),
available
at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/
1996/82.html.
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tournament here in the United States, there is widespread
domestic knowledge that “Wimbledon” denotes a tennis
tournament in England,234 and this knowledge preceded any
offering of branded goods or services here.235 In addition,
McDonald’s successfully proved to the South African Supreme
Court that it had a protectable reputation in South Africa before
it began to operate there.236 This phenomenon may be infrequent
in comparison with the large number of trademarks actually in
use in the world, but it does exist.
Proof of local use is a proxy for proof of goodwill, which is the
keystone of commercial and consumer interests protected by
trademark law. The notion that trademark rights only extend to
the area of use is a shortcut to approximate the geographic
extent of a mark’s goodwill. The presumption is that a mark has
attained a level of recognition within any geographic area in
which it has been used.
Use is, in a sense, a type of
circumstantial evidence recognized as a valid substitute for direct
evidence of goodwill. Proof of use allows a mark owner to prove
the extent of the goodwill without having to resort to direct
evidence, such as consumer surveys. It is the prior existence of
goodwill, or secondary meaning, within a certain consumer
population that likely leads to confusion in a mark if a second
user begins use of the same or a similar mark.
The reputation and goodwill associated with a mark may
cross an international border even if the good or service itself is
not traded across that border.237 Confusion that occurs on one
side of a border may flow back to the other. Such confusion in a
foreign market can harm the mark owner in its home market in
the form of lessened sales to travelers, damage to reputation that
234
See All-England Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques Inc., 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1069, 1072 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
235
See id.
236
McDonald’s Corp., 1997 (1) SA 1(SCA) at 62–65.
237
See, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 758, 193 N.Y.S.2d
332, 334 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1959) (French restaurant with international fame);
Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 552, 288 N.Y.S. 529,
530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1936) (French restaurant with international fame); see also
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (discussing knowledge in the United States of the COHIBA cigar mark used
by the plaintiff Cuban company in other countries but not in the United States,
particularly knowledge that might have been created by a six-page article
distributed in the United States in Cigar Aficionado entitled “The legend of Cohiba:
Cigar Lovers Everywhere Dream of Cuba’s Finest Cigar”).
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hinders expansion, and the like. Acknowledging that reputation
can precede use and respecting the confusion that might arise
from a junior use fit quite well with the basic principles
underlying trademark law.238
In considering the existence of goodwill or reputation, and
thus the possibility of a valid claim for confusion, it is vital to
recognize that a well-known mark owner would not be barred
from obtaining relief under the Dawn Donut rule. In a Dawn
Donut type case, the registrant has no reputation or goodwill in
the geographic market at issue. As such, the court may find that
no real likelihood of confusion exists. If a mark is well known in
the United States, or a portion of its territory, then it has a
reputation there, meaning that confusion can arise and a
protectable interest should be recognized. The Dawn Donut rule
does not say otherwise.
In the case of a well-known foreign mark, courts are
reluctant to recognize, and in fact refuse to recognize in many
instances, an analogue to the long-accepted domestic situation
where reputation precedes use. This resistance is due to the
existence of an international territorial boundary between the
area of actual use and the area in which the foreign trademark
owner enjoys a reputation among consumers without actual use.
The importance of a territorial boundary in law, and in
trademark law in particular, however, demonstrates that these
territorial boundaries should not pose an insurmountable barrier
to the protection sought by an owner of a well-known foreign
mark.
2.

Extrinsic Territoriality

In addition to being intrinsic to trademark law, as set forth
above, concerns about the territorial reach of trademark rights
are supported outside of trademark law as part of a broader legal
construct. The political concern of territoriality, the idea that a
nation’s laws only have prescriptive jurisdiction within that
nation’s territory, certainly finds traction in many areas of the
law. But providing protection to the foreign owners of well-

238

Accord Reichard & Sneed, supra note 175, at 94–95 (finding the Tea Rose
doctrine to support, rather than deny, protection for well-known foreign marks in a
territory where the mark has become known without local use).
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known marks does not contravene the political basis for
territorial limits on trademark rights.
The key concern with the political territoriality construct
recognizes that application of a nation’s laws to govern conduct
occurring outside the nation’s territorial boundaries will often
violate the principle of comity among nations.239 Under the Paris
Convention and TRIPS Agreement conceptions of protecting a
well-known foreign mark, the conduct being governed by a
nation’s laws is only conduct occurring within that nation’s
territory. There is no comity concern; no nation’s laws are
extending beyond the scope of its territory. The ownership rights
recognized in a trademark may be based upon the well-known
mark owner’s conduct—namely, extensive use—outside the
territory, but the conduct being restricted is only the defendant’s
conduct within the territory. And the rights recognized within
the territory are based on the effect of that defendant’s conduct
within the territory.
Any injunction issued against a junior user’s U.S. activity
would restrain only activity in this country. Moreover, the
protection of well-known foreign marks by U.S. courts and the
U.S. trademark office within the United States is an obligation
the United States willingly undertook close to a century ago.
Enforcing that obligation does not negatively affect the territorial
sovereignty of the United States. By including the obligation to
protect well-known foreign marks within the relevant treaties,
the member nations have agreed to recognize, under their own
territorially limited prescriptive authority, the potential for the
reputation of certain marks to extend beyond the territory of
actual use or registration.
Advocating for the protection of well-known foreign marks
creates a very slight divergence from intrinsic connotations of
territoriality in that it requires looking beyond certain shorthand
rules of thumb that courts use in other, primarily domestic,
contexts.
But with respect to the political dimension of
territoriality, there is no divergence whatsoever.

239

See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993); id.
at 813–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 116–21
(1st Cir. 2005).
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D. Standard of Protection and Associated Costs
Knowledge of a foreign mark in one area of a country should
not necessarily create nationwide rights, just as the same is true
of a domestic unregistered mark. Recognition of the well-known
status of a mark and subsequent legal protection should be tied
only to the geographic area where a significant number of the
relevant consumers are familiar with the mark. This allows the
law to appropriately limit the scope of protection for a wellknown foreign mark in a manner analogous to the standard rule
of thumb governing geographically limited uses. Moreover, it
revives the original theory behind trademark law, namely, that
goodwill is the heart of a trademark. The extent of injunctive
relief for an owner of a well-known foreign mark, when likelihood
of confusion is also proven, would mirror the relief available to a
domestic common law mark owner in that it would be
geographically limited. The injunction provided by a court would
only reach to the limits of the well-known status of the mark—
the limits of the goods or services in connection with which the
mark is well known, as well as the geographic limits of
knowledge by the consuming public. With a claim based only on
likelihood of confusion with a well-known mark, the injunctive
relief granted should be as limited as it would be in a domestic
dispute related to a simple common law trademark.
Identifying legal protection for well-known foreign marks in
current U.S. law and giving some contours to its scope does not
end the inquiry. The next question is how well known a mark
must be to qualify for protection. Neither the Paris Convention
nor the TRIPS Agreement defines “well known.”240 Each member
nation is free to apply an appropriate standard within its
domestic law. The Joint Recommendation provides guidance
beyond the binding agreements, but it also does not prescribe a
standard of knowledge.
Courts applying section 43(a) to foreign marks should be
cautious, but they should not foreclose a claim entirely. The
courts should require more than the existence of secondary
meaning, and they should require more than bare circumstantial
evidence. The Ninth Circuit in Grupo Gigante used the standard
of a “substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant

240

See supra Part II.A–B.
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American market.”241 The concurring opinion in the Ninth
Circuit decision declared that a “substantial percentage” would
be at least fifty percent.242 Given the vagaries of survey
construction and response tabulation,243 however, a set numerical
value for the level of familiarity required may not be any more
helpful than terminology like “substantial” or “significant.”
Courts should be convinced that the mark at issue is actually
familiar to an appropriate number of consumers in the market,
such that real harm to the foreign mark’s owner’s reputation and
consumer interests might occur if a likelihood of confusion is
found. For this reason, careful attention to the type of evidence
of market familiarity and reputation may be more important
than specifying a particular percentage of consumers who must
know of the mark.
Courts should not accept as sufficient evidence of a foreign
mark’s goodwill the same type of circumstantial evidence they
regularly consider in purely domestic cases. In domestic cases
involving secondary meaning, courts often readily accept
evidence regarding sales volume, advertising expenditures, and
length of time of use as proxies for direct evidence of whether a
mark has established secondary meaning.244 In cases involving
foreign marks not yet used in the United States, courts should
demand more direct evidence of a mark’s reputation among U.S.
consumers. Consumer surveys and testimony by individual
consumers can provide such direct evidence.245
Additional
evidence in the nature of third-party references, like newspaper
or magazine articles, or even direct testimony from disinterested
parties, can be relevant to reputation in appropriate
circumstances. If the foreign owner does not have, as it is
unlikely to have, survey evidence from the time before the junior
use began, courts can combine evidence of current knowledge
with other evidence like contemporaneous trade publications or

241

Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1108 (Graber, J., concurring).
243
See, e.g., Vincent N. Palladino, Surveying Secondary Meaning, 84
TRADEMARK REP. 155 passim (1994); Peter Weiss, The Use of Survey Evidence in
Trademark Litigation: Science, Art or Confidence Game?, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 71
passim (1990).
244
See Boston Beer Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 182 (1st Cir.
1993).
245
See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir.
2001).
242
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popular press articles. Consumer surveys could also include a
question asking when, to the best of the consumer’s knowledge,
he or she first became familiar with the mark at issue.246 Courts
weigh these varied types of evidence regularly,247 and there is no
reason to believe they will not be able to use similar judgment to
assess the approximate level of consumer familiarity that was
likely present at the time of the initial junior use.
The junior user’s knowledge of the mark’s foreign use may
also be relevant.248 Knowledge of the foreign senior use by the
junior user and how that knowledge was acquired would aid the
court in assessing whether other members of the relevant public
in the market at issue were also familiar with the foreign mark
at the time the junior user began its use. In other words, it
would assist the court in determining whether the junior use was
truly “remote” from the senior use in the way that domestic
disputes often rely on whether a junior use was “remote” from
the senior use.249 If the junior user was sufficiently familiar with
the senior mark to enable it to copy the senior mark, that copying
may have been done with the intention to confuse, or it may have
simply indicated an intention to mimic another’s wise business
acumen in choosing an apt mark.250 Either way, the junior user’s
246
See, e.g., Kerzner Int’l Ltd. v. Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1040, 1042 (D. Nev. 2009) (stating that later-developed evidence can be
relevant to the well-known status of a mark as of an earlier date, but declaring one
later-performed survey to lack probative value when it did not include an inquiry as
to when respondents had first heard of the foreign mark in question).
247
See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 418–20 (6th
Cir. 2006) (assessing the existence of secondary meaning for trade dress of a
“Hummer” sport-utility vehicle by reference to very strong evidence in consumer
studies conducted after infringement); see also Black & Decker, Inc. v. Pro-Tech
Power Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that a 1998 survey
showing eighty-five percent brand recognition was strong enough to establish
secondary meaning in 1992).
248
Knowledge of the foreign senior use would not necessarily be significant with
respect to the typical “defendant’s intent” or “defendant’s bad faith” factor courts
apply in assessing likelihood of confusion. For analysis of the “good faith” factor in
likelihood of confusion, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1628 (2006) (arguing that
based on his empirical study, courts routinely rely heavily on intent when that
evidence favors the trademark owner).
249
See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 420 (1916).
250
U.S. trademark decisions do not turn expressly on intent to confuse or even
knowledge of the prior right of the senior user. Instead, these matters are considered
among many others, and completely “innocent” junior users can easily become
infringers, as long as the constellation of factors points to a likelihood of confusion.
See supra notes 9, 224. In any event, I do not argue that a junior user’s knowledge
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familiarity provides some indication of whether other members of
the relevant consuming market had similar familiarity with the
mark.
There are, to be sure, systemic and individual costs
associated with the recognition of rights in well-known foreign
marks, even recognition constrained by the standard of
knowledge set forth above. U.S. businesses could lose some
amount of certainty in the process of selecting a trademark. A
rule like that set forth by the Second Circuit is certain, and it
means that all foreign marks not in actual use in this country
may be adopted here, as long as they are not subject to protection
through a registration under section 44. Acknowledging that
section 43(a) contains protection for well-known foreign marks
means that U.S. businesses will be charged, to some extent, with
knowing what their customers know about foreign marks.
Businesses might also incur somewhat heightened search costs
related to the search process in that a thorough search for the
availability of a U.S. mark will need to include the domestic
popular press as well as more traditional domestic sources of
information such as trade publications and Dun and Bradstreet
reports.
Graeme Dinwoodie has expressed some concern that a strong
well-known marks doctrine may undermine incentives to
participate in international registration systems, at a time when
those systems are becoming more efficient and more

widespread.251

Widespread

failures

to

participate

in

should be determinative in a well-known marks case. Cf. Beth Fulkerson, Theft by
Territorialism: A Case for Revising TRIPS To Protect Trademarks from National
Market Foreclosure, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 801, 802, 821–25 (1996) (proposing a rule
that would allow a foreign trademark owner to block a domestic use or registration
based on “awareness of foreign use” rather than only in cases of well-known mark
status).
251
See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 960–61. Despite Professor Dinwoodie’s
expressed concern related to the potential cost of widely recognizing rights in wellknown marks, he appears to favor correction of the Second Circuit’s total denial of
rights in those marks under federal law. See id. at 888. He served as counsel of
record to the American Intellectual Property Law Association when it filed an
amicus brief with the Supreme Court supporting the foreign trademark owner’s
petition for writ of certiorari following the Second Circuit decision in ITC. See Brief
for American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
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international registration systems would further increase the
uncertainty in and the costs of selecting a trademark.
The first two costs or concerns, certainty and search costs,
while real, will be ameliorated in large part by a known and
possibly heightened standard for when a mark is “well known.”252
The last issue, undermining participation in international
registration systems, should become a non-issue if a sufficiently
high, yet manageable, standard is set.
Well-known mark
protection would be, and should be, only a safety net for an owner
of a foreign mark. The standard for proving well-known status
will require, in all likelihood, a consumer survey. And in any
event, enforcing rights in a well-known mark through section
43(a) will require expensive litigation. As such, any trademark
owner who is actually examining what steps it should take to
protect its marks in the United States—or any other major
market’s jurisdiction, for that matter—is unlikely to rely on wellknown mark protection as its first line of defense against junior
appropriators. Although the risk of infringement and associated
litigation might seem quite low ex ante, the magnitude of the cost
would still mean that the comparison of costs and the relative
certainty of protection would direct that trademark owner toward
filing an application to register the mark on the basis of a foreign
registration. In the United States, the most likely route would be
section 44(e) of the Lanham Act.253

Petitioner at *3–4, ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 552 U.S. 827 (2007) (No. 06-1722),
2007 WL 2174224 (taking no position on which party should prevail on the merits of
the case but urging reversal of the Second Circuit decision denying the existence of
protection for well-known foreign marks under federal law).
252
Cf. Thomas L. Casagrande, What Must a Foreign Service Mark Holder Do To
Create and Maintain Trademark Rights in the United States?, 93 TRADEMARK REP.
1354, 1370 n.93 (2003) (arguing that trademark clearance concerns arising from the
award of U.S. rights in marks not used within the United States “may be overstated”
in light of the wide scope of the search in modern clearance practice and “the global
nature” of the sources used in those searches).
253
15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2006). Section 44(e) states:
A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may
be registered on the principal register if eligible, otherwise on the
supplemental register in this chapter provided. Such applicant shall
submit, within such time period as may be prescribed by the Director, a
true copy, a photocopy, a certification, or a certified copy of the registration
in the country of origin of the applicant. The application must state the
applicant’s bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in
commerce shall not be required prior to registration.
Id.
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A serious foreign trademark owner would have a registration
in at least one country, likely its country of origin, since the rest
of the world relies so heavily on registration systems rather than
the possibility of use-based rights.254 And while a section 44(e)
applicant must declare a bona fide intention to use the mark in
commerce in the United States, this is highly unlikely to pose a
serious practical impediment to an application. Trademark
owners who are taking a proactive foreign protection position will
likely expect to exploit the U.S. market in some way in the
reasonably foreseeable future, giving them the required bona fide
intention to use the mark.255 Any applications that might
otherwise have been made will not be discouraged by the
requirement of intent to use or the mere availability of possible
protection as a well-known mark.256 A low standard for what
makes a mark “well known” might, on the other hand, encourage
reliance on well-known mark protection and undermine the
international registration systems. If only minimal recognition
by an insignificant number of consumers were required, then the
likely ease and inexpensiveness of obtaining that proof could
discourage proactive registration of rights.257

A court applying the Dawn Donut rule might well deny a remedy to a section
44(e) registrant who has not followed its registration with domestic use of the mark.
Thus, the ability to register under section 44(e) may be effective at only blocking
later registrations but not later uses, due to the intervention of this common law
rule. Perhaps even more important for foreign owners, section 44(e) only provides
limited-time protection, since a mark is: (1) deemed abandoned after three years of
non-use, see id. § 1127 (definition of when a mark will be deemed “abandoned”);
(2) any registration is subject to cancellation for abandonment, see id. § 1064(3); (3) a
defendant can assert abandonment as a defense to any section 32 action, see
id. § 1115(a), (b)(2); and (4) all registrations, section 44(e) included, are subject to the
requirements of section 8 of the Lanham Act, which mandates periodic filings of
declarations of use in order to maintain a registration.
254
See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2.
255
In addition, given the lack of such a requirement in the rest of the world,
many foreign trademark owners will sign the declaration without taking its terms
very seriously. Without advocating for foreign owners to disregard the requirement
of a bona fide intention to use the mark in the United States, a realistic observer will
understand it to be a minor hurdle indeed.
256
More discouraging to section 44(e) applicants are the standard of
abandonment, which includes failure to use the mark for at least three years, see
supra note 253, and decisions in which that standard has been applied to cancel
registrations held by foreign owners, both in cancellation proceedings at the PTO,
see, e.g., British-Am. Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1585
(T.T.A.B. 2000), and in litigation, see ITC, 482 F.3d at 145.
257
See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 960–61.
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CONCLUSION

The United States provides protection to the owners of wellknown foreign marks through section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
By doing so, the United States meets its international obligations
to protect those marks under the Paris Convention, the TRIPS
Agreement, and other international agreements.258 The United
States has clearly signaled to the international community its
position that even marks only used in foreign nations must be
protected if they are domestically well known.259 As a result, it is
appropriate for the United States to fully come to grips with the
meaning and value of “territoriality” in its trademark law so that
it may recognize the existing integration of its obligation to
protect well-known foreign marks within its domestic, territorial
trademark law.260
Asking judicial decisionmakers to confront the full meaning
of territoriality within trademark law may disturb some
previously settled expectations and even case precedent set by
those decisionmakers.261 On a more global and theoretical scale,
Graeme Dinwoodie urges that any analysis of international legal
principles, including examination of the recognition of wellknown marks, must be mindful of both the social and the
political values that inhere in the territoriality of trademarks.262
Taking these two concerns together merits two separate but
related questions: First, whether existing law, as I interpret it,
constitutes a “significant departure from the principle of
territoriality,”263 considered by certain experienced judges to be
“the bedrock principle of [U.S.] trademark law,”264 and second,
258
Debate does remain as to the full extent of the well-known marks obligation,
namely, whether a nation must protect only marks that are not registered
domestically, but that are used domestically, or whether a nation must also protect
marks that have been neither registered nor used here. My argument for the
broader range of protection is infra Part II.C.
259
See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
260
As the Supreme Court observed more than two centuries ago, “an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
261
Courts in all circuits but the Second Circuit remain free to follow the Ninth
Circuit’s lead on this issue. In the Second Circuit, of course, either an en banc
opinion or a Supreme Court decision will be required.
262
Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 890.
263
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007).
264
Id. at 164 n.26; see also Almacenes Exito v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F.
Supp. 2d 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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whether the approach I urge here “elevate[s] concerns about
domestic consumer confusion without consideration of other
values underlying territoriality,”265 thus “ignoring an increase in
uncertainty and search costs, and . . . undermining the
established international systems for registration of rights on a
multinational basis.”266 My interpetation of the statutes, cases,
and underlying principles, as well as international obligations,
which requires a high standard of local knowledge before
protection is provided to a well-known foreign mark and provides
a limited scope of relief for the owner of the foreign mark,
remains sound after careful consideration of the intrinsic and
extrinsic facets of territoriality within trademark law.
In this Article, I have provided a sound justification and a
roadmap for recognizing the protection for well-known foreign
marks that exists in current law. I have done so in light of a full
explication of the intrinsic and extrinsic territoriality of
trademark law, the statutory language of the Lanham Act, and
existing international obligations. I appreciate and share the
concern that well-known foreign mark protection without
domestic use may “undervalue[ ] the importance of territoriality
rooted in national political and economic structures”267 in favor of
overvaluing the aspect of territoriality rooted in consumer
goodwill. That concern is better addressed by requiring a strong
showing of goodwill in the relevant market than by ignoring our
international obligations and interests. The approach I advocate
here accurately characterizes existing protection and provides a
standard that balances the costs and benefits of protecting wellknown marks within the existing social, cultural, political, and
economic confines of trademark territoriality.

265
266
267

Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 932.
Id.
Id.

